Applying The Rule Of Law Subjectively: How Appellate Courts Adjudicate by Collazo, Emmett S.
  303
Applying the Rule of Law Subjectively:                  
How Appellate Courts Adjudicate 
Emmett S. Collazo†  
I. Introduction ............................................................................. 305 
II. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem:                                                
Hansen’s Graphical Explanation................................................. 312 
A. Arrow’s Theorem............................................................... 312 
i. Hansen’s Graphical Proof:                                                          
Between Two Individuals, One is a Dictator ...................... 314 
ii. Groups of Greater Than Two Individuals....................... 320 
A. A Majority Rule Problem: Condorcet’s Paradox....... 320 
B. Begin with Condorcet’s Paradox and Apply 
Completeness .................................................................. 321 
C. Relaxing Postulates .................................................... 325 
III. Does Arrow Preclude Legislative Intent? ............................. 330 
A. Legislative Intent and the Limits for Interpretivism .......... 330 
B. What is Legislative Intent?................................................. 332 
C. Arrow’s Theorem Will Not Disprove the Existence of 
Legislative Intent .................................................................... 333 
D. Hovenkamp: Independence Does Not Apply to Legislatures
................................................................................................. 335 
IV. Multimember Judicial Decisions .......................................... 337 
A. Non-dictatorship and Pareto............................................... 338 
B. Stearns and Standing .......................................................... 339 
C. Easterbrook and Transitivity .............................................. 340 
D. Relaxing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Bargaining 
is Positively Necessary, and Normatively Acceptable ........... 342 
                                                                                                             
 †  Emmett S. Collazo; J.D., LL.M., George Mason School of Law, 2007; 
ecollazo@gmu.edu. My gratitude to Professors Michael Krauss and Lloyd Cohen of the 
George Mason University School of Law. Thank you for your guidance. To the George 
Mason Law Professors Alex Tabarrok and Randall Clark, thank you for your advice, as 
well. I am also grateful to the members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review for their efforts 
and insight in editing this paper. Last and most importantly, nothing works without 
Roseann and Joseph. 
304 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 4:303 
1. Process of Elimination: Majority Rule Fails Unless 
Independence is Relaxed..................................................... 342 
2. Majority Rule Survives if Independence is Relaxed....... 342 
3. Majority Rule: An Illegitimate Strategy? ....................... 348 
4. The Goal is a Decision.................................................... 351 
V. Subjective use of a powerful position forms the                   
“Rule of Law” ............................................................................. 354 
A. Review ............................................................................... 354 
B. Contracts and Stare Decisis: This Court and the Next....... 355 
1. Are Contracts the Answer? No. ...................................... 356 
2. Stare Decisis ................................................................... 358 
VI. Conclusion ............................................................................ 360 
 
Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply 
them . . . We do not turn a matter over to a judge because we want his 
view about what the best idea is or what the best solution is. It is because 
we want him or her to apply the law. Judges are constrained when they 
apply the law. They are constrained by the words that Congress chooses 
to enact into law when interpreting the law. They are constrained by the 
words of the Constitution. They are constrained by the precedents of 
other judges that become part of the rule of law that they must apply . . . 
people on both sides need to realize that the Supreme Court will handle 
cases on a level playing field—the justices are going to interpret the law 
and apply the Constitution without taking sides in the dispute.1 
A ritual is enacted whenever a nominee for a federal judgeship 
appears before the Senate Judiciary Committee as part of the 
confirmation process. One Senator will ask, “Do you intend to apply the 
law rather than make it?” Another will ask, “Will you apply the words of 
the Constitution in the way that the framers intended?” Nominees, some 
of whom ought to know better, play their part in the ritual by answering 
“Yes” to both questions. Sometimes this ritual provides the opportunity 
                                                                                                             
 1 ROBERTS, J., C.J., Sept. 12–15, 2005, testifying before the Senate Judiciary Comm. 
rpc.senate.gov/_files/Sept2005RobertsSD.pdf (last viewed Dec. 3, 2007). For remarks by 
current and former Republican presidential nominees that echo this statement, see 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120226814194646733.html?mod=opinion_journal_feder
ation (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). (Sen. John McCain: “I will nominate judges who 
understand that their role is to faithfully apply the law as written, not impose their 
opinions through judicial fiat.”; former Gov. Mike Huckabee: “I firmly believe that the 
Constitution must be interpreted according to its original meaning, and flatly reject the 
notion of a “living Constitution”; Rep. Ron Paul: “Judicial activism, after all, is the 
practice of judges ignoring the law and deciding cases based on their personal political 
views.”).  
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for a degradation ceremony, in which the subject may be made to debase 
himself or herself as a prerequisite to a transition into the new status. 
More often, it allows the nominee to engage in anticipatory socialization 
by behaving before the Committee as he or she will behave on the bench. 
But like most rituals, this one is important primarily because it reveals to 
us some of the deep assumptions prevalent in the culture.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is 
the power of the judiciary to say what the law is.”3 From such reasoning, 
courts exercise great power when interpreting statutes, constitutions, and 
prior cases. New lawyers are chiefly trained by examining decisions 
from appellate courts. Yet what do we lawyers know of the structural 
limits of those appellate courts,4 and of group decision-making? This 
Article aims to define the capacity and limits of appellate courts in order 
to challenge positions regarding the Rule of Law. The Article argues that 
appellate courts are limited during the creation of any legal 
interpretation. 
Consider the first introductory passage as well as the following: 
John Paul Stevens: “‘It seems to me that one of the overriding 
principles in running the country is the government ought to be 
neutral. . . . It has a very strong obligation to be impartial, and not 
use its power to advance political agendas or personal agendas.”5 
Robert Bork: “The judge’s authority derives entirely from the 
fact that he is applying6 the law and not his personal values. That 
is why the American public accepts the decisions of its courts, 
                                                                                                             
 2 Tushnet, M., Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781 (1983) (footnotes omitted). 
 3 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 4 In the words of Justice Scalia, I will focus on the “science of interpretation.”  
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3 
(Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton University Press 1997). 
 5 Jeffrey Rosen, The Dissenter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 50 
(quoting Justice Stevens on legal thinking and the judicial role). The critical issue is 
exactly what it means to be “neutral.” This Article suggests that neutrality is a subjective 
determination, irreconcilable with an objective rule of law. Appellate courts cannot 
objectively apply neutrality. 
 6 To apply: 1 a: to put to use especially for some practical purpose <applies pressure 
to get what he wants> b: to bring into action <apply the brakes> c: to lay or spread on 
<apply varnish> d: to put into operation or effect <apply a law>. http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/apply (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
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accepts even decisions that nullify the laws a majority of the 
electorate or of their representatives voted for.”7 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg: “Federal judges, whether appointed by 
Republican or Democratic Presidents, generally endeavor to 
administer justice impartially and to interpret laws reasonably 
and sensibly, with due restraint and fidelity to precedent . . . 
Proper judicial action is to use best efforts to ‘adjudicate cases 
fairly.’”8 
Despite these comments, how do contemporary courts (1) make law 
neutrally, (2) apply the law instead of personal values, and (3) show 
fidelity to precedent in order to administer justice impartially? Each idea 
(neutrality, application of laws, and objective fidelity to precedent) is 
impossible; such statements are hortatory signals that can only be served 
within bounds of “reasonableness” and “political morality.”9 The 
statements above all assume that some degree of objectivity exists to 
support appellate court legitimacy. These assumptions are incorrect. 
Personal agendas are formed from subjective preferences, including 
political preferences that are the source of what this Article calls the 
judiciary’s “cardinal bargains.” Cardinal bargains are imperative 
compromises by judges that allow the formation of interpretation. 
Without such compromises, it would be mathematically impossible for 
the courts to produce majority opinions unless, at times, the adjudication 
was the result of the minority producing the outcome. 
Due to this mathematical severity, this Article concludes that the 
Rule of Law, unlike scientific truths, cannot be derived from any 
independent and objective source. This supposition informs our 
understanding of what the Rule of Law can and cannot be. The Article 
applies this conclusion to appellate court theory. Specifically, it finds that 
the prominent theories offered to support the legitimacy of appellate 
courts, as well as inferences of “objectivity” that legitimize stare decisis, 
are flawed. 
                                                                                                             
 7 THE BORK HEARINGS 3 (Ralph E. Shaffer ed., Marcus Wiener Publishers (2005)) 
(quoting Judge Bork, emphasis added). Judge Bork later said: “[T]o discuss my general 
approach to stare decisis and the kind of factors I would consider. . . . [There is a] need 
for continuity and stability in the law. . . . I think the preservation of confidence in the 
Court [is maintained] by not saying that this crowd just does whatever they feel like as 
the personnel changes.” Id. at 60–61. 
 8 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Judicial Independence: The Situation of the U.S. Federal 
Judiciary, 85 NEB. L. REV. 1, 7 (2006). 
 9 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
127 (Amy Gutmann ed,, Princeton University Press 1997). This concept is discussed by 
Ronald Dworkin. 
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Considering the larger implication, in appellate bodies the 
seemingly valid idea (if not a wholly assumed idea) that judges should 
“apply” the laws is, in fact, void. The fault is not in the declarer’s 
purpose, nor in some suspicious and untrustworthy battle among furtive 
and polar political philosophers conspiring against each other. Instead, 
the problem is inherent in the assumption that a body composed of 
equally weighted voices can lift itself above the fray of battling 
jurisprudential theories and apply the one “true” Rule of Law. This 
cannot occur at an appellate court, and social choice illustrates why it 
cannot. 
Kenneth Arrow’s “Impossibility Theorem” is a mathematical proof 
that examines group decision-making. These group decisions may result 
in legislation, in an appellate court opinion, or any other decision where 
each member of the group has an equal vote. From certain seemingly 
palatable and purportedly necessary axioms, Arrow showed that conflict 
exists and even perfect cooperation among members of any group fails. 
Group decision-making processes fail because the standards proposed as 
ethically and politically “fair” are incompatible with one another. 
Importantly, Arrow’s proof does not merely provide an insight for 
expectations of all group decisions. Rather, it can be used to understand 
why some jurisprudential methods are “positively” unworkable.10 These 
interpretive methods fail when they assume appellate adjudication does 
not depend on individual judges’ subjective authority to bargain over the 
law. Arrow’s Proof commands that judges use a subjective power. This 
poses problems for the jurisprudence of statutory interpretation presented 
in the “liberal project.”11 That is, though jurisprudence scholars offer 
restrictions on judicial power through interpretivism (such as 
                                                                                                             
 10 Unlike ideas in law and economics that may attempt to show what is “good” or 
“bad” normatively, Arrow’s proof is a “positive” limit on the possible. This enables the 
potential examination to be largely free of political leaning, which creates a firmer 
foundation for later discussions of the potential normative roles of judges and the Rule of 
Law. I thus use the term “positive” to signify the irrelevance of any relative or 
comparative ideas, and instead focus attention on the absolute. 
 11 The term “liberal project” refers to a movement that attempts to satisfy the 
jurisprudential theoretical need of consistency, as well as the idea that all individuals’ 
subjective preferences are to a large degree, if not completely, equally valid. For a 
description of this “liberal individualism,” as well as a description of the jurisprudential 
efforts to satisfy this ideal, see Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A 
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 783–786 
(1983). For further views on the tension between political science and this liberal project, 
see generally Perry, M., A Critique of the “Liberal” Political-Philosophical Project, 28 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 205 (1987); Steven Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law, 
11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 435 (1999) (examining the tension between liberal political 
theory and the law and why concepts of justice and law may be intertwined). 
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intentionalism) or neutral principles,12 these proposals ultimately fail. 
This article argues that several scholars incorrectly applied the Arrow 
proof to the judicial-legislative relationship. It then offers a correct 
examination of the judiciary in light of Arrow’s proof. 
Chiefly, the Article examines an intentionalist perspective of 
“applying” the law. However, the analysis applies to any version of 
statutory interpretation that suggests legitimacy through purported 
consistency. Regarding intentionalism, the Article suggests that while a 
legislature certainly creates statutes and perhaps possesses “legislative 
intent,”13 the judiciary’s corresponding analysis of statutes, cases, and 
constitutions involves power. This power is the use of individuals’ 
intensity-preferences by multi-member panels. Individuals bargain in a 
“cardinal,” and not “ordinal” manner.14 This means appellate judges use 
their individual convictions to bargain among subjective determinations 
of the importance of various principles. If they do not do this, the 
decision-making process will fail, because another critical Arrovian 
assumption must be broken, or “relaxed.” If an improper Arrovian 
assumption is relaxed, the result is an incoherent decision-making 
process.15 If judges do use subjective preferences to decide cases, a group 
decision is permissible. However, the Article will show that this implies 
the law-reader is the law-giver, and inappropriately conflicts with the 
                                                                                                             
 12 “Neutral principles” was a proposal by Wechsler as an alternative version of 
jurisprudence that would limit politics from encroaching on the judiciary. See Herbert 
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 77–78, Harvard University Press (1995). But see 
Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983) (criticizing neutral principles). 
 13 That legislative intent may exist is an assumption in this Article; the veracity of 
this assumption, as well as how to find it, is irrelevant to the proof’s application in this 
Article. 
 14 “Cardinal” numbering refers to a numerical quantity rather than an order (e.g., the 
Orioles have “five” runs more than the Red Sox). The opposite of this is “ordinal” 
numbering, which refers to a specific position in a series (e.g., that was the “fifth” home 
run of the game). 
 15 One may question, “Aren’t judicial opinions simply incoherent? Isn’t this exactly 
what happens?” When the Article says “incoherent,” it means, for example, that an 
appellate court outcome of four to five occurred, but the four votes provide the holding. 
Better yet, imagine one vote providing the holding instead of eight contrary and 
homogeneous votes. “Incoherence” here is not to say that precedents will not be 
inconsistent with each other in appellate law. The incoherency to which I refer above is 
the intractable and irrational outcome of a “loser” position beating a “winner” position as 
we do not expect according to majority rule. Further, just when majority rule would “fail” 
is not predictable, adding to what I call “incoherence.” The problem is dramatic and 
pervasive in that one single decision’s logical consistency is ruined. In sum, the problem 
in relaxing the wrong Arrovian assumption is a single decision makes no sense—not that 
the adjudicated precedents are inconsistent. 
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objective idea of “ascertaining” and “applying” the one true and 
objective Rule of Law.16 
Part II provides an intuitive understanding of Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem. Kenneth Arrow proved that if a collective decision-making 
process could successfully implement the four characteristics of 
“Universal Range,” “Transitivity,” “Pareto,” and an “Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives,” then a fifth characteristic, the existence of a 
“dictator,” must exist as well.17 
In lay terms, Arrow simply analyzed decision-making. He 
developed assumptions about how a fair decision-making system should 
work, resulting in the most benefits for all. He formulated a proof about 
group choices resulting from assumptions that seem based on fairly weak 
constraints.18 The proof is powerful because it proves that cooperation 
itself is rigidly limited. Cooperation is limited irrespective of the 
presence of relevant extremes among the group’s political or subjective 
preferences. Part II presents an intuitive understanding of this proof. 
In Part III, the Article examines the relationship between the 
judiciary and the legislature in light of Arrow’s Theorem. It reviews 
several theories of jurisprudence including textualism, intentionalism, 
pragmatism and Dworkinism. The focus is on the jurisprudential 
legitimacy of intentionalism, and the debate about whether it is possible 
to aggregate individual preferences into a coherent “legislative intent.” 
                                                                                                             
 16 Tushnet, supra note 2, at 781–82 (citing the “degradation ceremony” of nominees 
being scolded by senators to “apply” the law). 
 17 Kenneth Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POLITICAL 
ECON. 328 (1950). Arrow won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1972. These 
characteristics mean something specific in public choice economics, which is defined 
more technically in Part II. Briefly, “universal range” refers to the existence of more than 
two choices for any group decision (for example, a choice between chocolate, vanilla, or 
strawberry). The “transitivity” characteristic means that if chocolate ice cream is 
preferred to vanilla (abbreviated as chocolate ‘P’ vanilla), and vanilla is preferred to 
strawberry (again, vanilla ‘P’ strawberry), then chocolate also (due to the transitive 
property), is preferred to strawberry (chocolate ‘P’ strawberry). The “Pareto principle” 
(for these limited purposes) states that if a group universally decides one outcome is 
“best,” then the group prefers that choice, as well. “Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives” means two things: (1) if a group prefers chocolate over vanilla, adding in a 
choice strawberry is not allowed to affect the choice between the first two; and (2) all 
choices are made through ordinal preference rankings (i.e., first choice, second choice, 
third choice, etc.), rather than a cardinal “points” system (e.g., “I vote that chocolate gets 
seven points, vanilla gets two, and strawberry gets one.”). “Dictatorship” means that 
every possible outcome in a group’s decision, when examined ex ante, coincides 
perfectly with one single person’s desires, even in the face of contrary majorities. The 
term “dictator” does not connote either benevolence or existence of a despot. The term is 
thus “value free.” Paul Hansen, Another Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem, 33 J. ECON. EDUC. 217, 220 (2002). 
 18 Arrow, supra note 17. 
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After a brief review of Gerald MacCallum’s legislative intent theories,19 
this Article concludes that Arrow’s Theorem does not preclude the 
finding of legislative intent. This is important because it allows appellate 
bodies to operate without legislative interference. That is, if appellate 
courts are somehow structurally limited in adjudicating cases, it is not 
necessarily due to a structural consequence of the legislature’s incapacity 
to form an “intent.” 
Thus, Arrow’s Theorem is irrelevant to legislative decisions 
because legislatures do not need to retain Arrow’s Independence 
criterion. This Independence criterion proves critical. Put plainly, there 
are no normative restrictions on the legislature. The legislature is thus 
freed from a dooming application of Arrow’s Proof. As a political 
branch, it may draw arbitrary lines or perhaps make no decision at all on 
an issue for any reason. Since Arrow’s Theorem does not disprove the 
existence of legislative intent due to contradictions between the proof 
and the legislative mechanism, the Article next discusses jurisprudential 
coordination theories between the legislature and the judiciary. This step 
demonstrates why appellate courts themselves hold a structural 
constraint. The constraint is that the courts create meanings from 
subjective preferences when they interpret and adjudicate. 
Part IV examines multi-member appellate court decisions in light of 
Arrow’s Theorem. Then Professor, now Judge Easterbrook analyzed this 
specific issue. Easterbrook concluded that Arrow’s Theorem demands 
appellate courts inevitably create inconsistent opinions.20 His argument 
indicates that inconsistency is inevitable because all Arrovian conditions 
except for “Transitivity” are necessary in the appellate decision-making 
process.  
This Article concludes that it is Arrow’s “Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives” assumption that must give way to the other four 
criteria. The same solution exists with the legislature. In the judiciary, 
however, there are consequences that impact our understanding of 
appellate court functions and jurisprudence as a whole. The Article first 
explains why Independence must be “relaxed,” instead of any of the 
other four characteristics. It then discusses why “relaxing Independence” 
correlates with the liberal project’s failed attempt to defend an objective 
Rule of Law within appellate courts. The defense fails because the Rule 
                                                                                                             
 19 Gerald C. MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 755–59 (1965). Just 
how the judicial mind determines this intent is not necessary in this Article; the proof that 
this intent is impossible to ascertain does not require an explanation of how the intent is 
determined. 
 20 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 
(1982). 
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of Law must be created by subjective determinations, case by case, 
where judges “bargain” over the importance of theoretical 
underpinnings. Alternative jurisprudential theories that may not be clear 
victors are never “irrelevant,” so subjective preferences among myriad 
theories must control the bargaining. This conclusion reinforces the 
impossibility of the liberal project’s idea of an objective Rule of Law 
because collective bodies of judges simply cannot, by any method, 
collectively ascertain and apply any objective mechanism when 
interpreting the law. 
The Article shows that every appellate decision requires individual 
judges to: (1) make subjective decisions about what the law should be; 
and (2) bargain among the panel of judges using subjective perceptions 
of the desirability of different interpretations. Because judges are not 
“applying the law,” but inventing the interpretation of the law through 
communal debate, the liberal project’s rule of law must fail. Rather, the 
law exists, as created by judges, specifically because the law is what a 
judge subjectively says it is. In contrast to the legislature, many—
including appellate judges themselves—state the legitimizing premise of 
the judge’s role is the existence of an objective fixture such as the Rule 
of Law, or perhaps “neutrality,” which judges “apply” to existing law 
rather than create new law. Arrow’s Theorem proves that such a design 
flounders. Instead, personal convictions and subjective intensity 
preferences are the necessary ingredients in appellate judgments. If not 
for these preferences, the group decision would violate Arrow’s Proof. 
This Article demonstrates how such incoherence is avoided. 
However, the logic appears to leave a discrepancy. The liberal 
project purports to uphold the Rule of Law for legitimacy in 
government.21 The remaining issue is whether a saving theory is needed 
or available for appellate courts. Since judges in appellate courts must 
                                                                                                             
 21 Reasons offered for the desire of objectivity in the Rule of Law include: “cultural 
heterogeneity,” ethical fears of despotism/dictatorship, cultural fears of 
oligarchy/monarchy, and a deep belief in “checks and balances.”  Dean Carrington 
suggested legal nihilism results in professional incompetence and a fear that only 
“cunning” survives in a society where might makes right. See Paul D. Carrington, Of Law 
and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984). Carrington stated, “The law . . . is a 
mere hope that people who apply the lash of power will seek to obey the law’s 
command.” Id. at 226. Carrington believed that officials, including judges, could 
inappropriately use power to pursue social and political agendas not embodied in the 
law.” Id. (emphasis added). This Articles disputes the last point by arguing that the power 
to pursue political agendas is part of judicial bargains. Judge/Dean/Professor Calabresi’s 
response is “[t]he role of the scholar is to look in dark places and to shed light on what he 
or she sees there . . . . [I]f in all honesty what the scholar sees seems false, then the 
scholar must declare it to be false even if that opens him or her up to the charge of 
nihilism.”  Guido Calabresi et al., Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 
23 (1985). 
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bargain cardinally, thus wielding power, the question becomes, what 
limitations are on judicial interpretations of the law that satisfy the 
objective “purist” as well as stare decisis theory? 
Part V examines the argument that controls exist to partially 
restrain the unadulterated use of individual power. The Article concludes 
that legal ethics, the political approval processes, and self-imposed 
restrictions (including the judicial standing doctrine, stare decisis, or 
other judicially manufactured restrictions such as Chevron deference22) 
fail to control subjective preferences. These controls are ineffective for 
the same reason that interpretive theory such as intentionalism fails. The 
only “solution” is for society to have proper expectations of appellate 
power: reasonableness and political morality are the subjective and 
vague resources that judges “apply.” The most effective understanding 
accepts that the courts are well placed for adjudication and finality only, 
and that theoretical objectivity demands the impossible. Even by limiting 
jurisdiction under “standing” or Chevron doctrines, for example, 
appellate bodies muster a subjective power to compromise and then 
create limitations on when to use such tools. 
The structure of appellate courts is thus one where, although we 
may assume they should be regulated to relinquish power, no objective 
law, ex ante, will function objectively. Judges, politicians, and the public 
should understand this fundament of appellate courts. Institutional 
arrangements may attempt to achieve society’s ends of providing 
fruitful—if bargained for—decisions, but they never truly temper and 
constrain appellate judges’ powers. The power and potential of the court 
is truly in the subjective assessments that judges act on.  
The Article concludes with a brief examination of stare decisis 
theory, and explores the reasons why judges might earnestly attempt to 
restrict themselves to previous subjective bargains.  
II. ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM:                                                
HANSEN’S GRAPHICAL EXPLANATION 
A. Arrow’s Theorem 
While attempting to derive critical characteristics of a social 
welfare function,23 Kenneth Arrow uncovered a characteristic of 
                                                                                                             
 22 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 23 The search for a social welfare function is an attempt to aggregate preferences in 
society, allocate commodities to maximize society’s welfare, and in general, provide the 
maximum amount of utility for all. Currently, this cannot be done. See DENNIS CARY 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 582 (3d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
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cooperative decision-making theory.24 Arrow’s five axioms show that 
any group, be it a city council, a legislature, or a multimember court 
behaving at its collective “best,” are limited if it chooses to apply itself in 
the Arrovian scheme. Specifically, Arrow found that no group can 
cooperate while staying true to four Arrovian assumptions unless there is 
a “dictator.” This shows that an inherent structural limitation exists in 
any group decision that attempts to abide by the five assumptions. 
Arrow’s five assumptions about decision-making are: 
(1) The Pareto principle (Pareto): If an individual’s preference is 
unopposed by any contrary preference of another, the 
individual’s preference is preserved in the social preference 
ordering outcome. That is, the outcome of the votes must retain 
that universal characteristic. For example, where three 
individuals’ three choices align perfectly (xyz, xyz, and xyz), the 
outcome will align with those preferences (i.e., the outcome 
cannot be anything other than xyz). However, if even one 
individual of three chose an alternative such as zyx, Pareto does 
not apply at all. 
(2) Non-dictatorship: No individual enjoys a position so that 
among his preferences between any two alternatives, and all 
others’ preferences expressing the opposite, his preferences are 
always preserved in the social ordering. (For example, if there are 
two votes for xyz, and one vote for zyx, if the decision-making 
process allowed all of the latter’s preferences, including zyx to 
“win” as society’s preferred outcome, this would violate the Non-
dictatorship characteristic). 
(3) Transitivity (and Completeness):25 The decision-making 
process gives a consistent ordering of all potential outcomes. (For 
example, if everyone agreed that aPb, and bPc, then we must 
conclude that aPc). Importantly, this assumption demands an 
output answer will be provided for every possibility. 
(4) Range: Some universal alternative exists such that for every 
pair of alternatives, each possible ordering of those two, plus at 
least a third option (or more), is an admissible ranking of all 
                                                                                                             
 24 Arrow, supra note 17. 
 25 “Completeness” is assumed as necessary to transitivity, and states that a decision 
must be made for every outcome. DENNIS CARY MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 582, 586 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2003). In part, this occurs because ranking is ordinal in 
the theorem, thus no “ties” may be offered by individuals. For example, one may rank 
choices as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd, but not 1st and two ties for 2nd. Parts IV and V show how 
completeness is necessary in the search for objectivity in jurisprudence. 
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alternatives for the individual. (In the simplest terms, this 
characteristic means there are always at least three (3) choices for 
the group to consider.) 
(5) Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (“IIA” or 
“Independence”): The social choice between any two alternatives 
depends only on the orderings that individuals make over those 
two alternatives and not on orderings over other alternatives.26 
For example, if three individuals prefer x to y (“xPy”), the 
addition of a third choice, z, cannot change the x versus y 
decision. This will be the most important characteristic to 
understand when applying the proof to jurisprudence. It is also 
the most difficult to understand. To restate this characteristic: any 
value judgment imposed by a social choice rule to resolve one 
particular preference conflict must hold for all other profiles. The 
key to understanding this characteristic will include a discussion 
of the difference between “ordinal” and “cardinal” ordering. This 
is discussed more in depth in Hansen’s illustration below, as it 
may be the best way to truly grasp the enormous consequences of 
this characteristic. 
The proof in next discussed in two parts. First, the Article 
introduces Hansen’s graphical illustration of Arrow’s Proof, which 
analyzes two persons making a decision among three choices. Then the 
Article shows why, even for group decisions of greater than two persons 
(perhaps in the millions or greater), intuition must be employed at the 
core of the proof for the decision among two persons. 
i. Hansen’s Graphical Proof:                                                          
Between Two Individuals, One is a Dictator 
Paul Hansen developed a graphical proof of Arrow’s Theorem as an 
educational tool using an example of two individuals making a 
decision.27 The individuals will be referred to as “Marshall” and 
“Taney.”28 Due to the Range requirement summarized above, assume 
Marshall and Taney are choosing their preferred outcomes among three 
possibilities: x, y, and z.29 Combinatorial math proves that if two persons 
                                                                                                             
 26 Id. at 583–84, (publishing the proof of William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and 
Social Decision Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507 (Nov. 1960)). 
 27 Paul Hansen, Another Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, 33 J. 
ECON. EDUC. 217, 218 (June 2002). 
 28 Foils adopted from Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 29 Range means that there must be at least three choices, but there may be more. For 
simplicity’s sake, this Article uses three, as it is the simplest number of choices which 
still conforms to the Range assumption. 
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must choose among three preferences, there are thirty-six possible 
combinations of choices between Marshall and Taney.30 We may 
randomly list the combinations, but for simplicity’s sake we will make 
“Profile 1” consists of: Marshall choosing (xyz), and Taney choosing 
(xyz).31 Profile 2 consists of: {Marshall (yzx), Taney (yzx)}.32 This 
process is then completed (with no need for any particular ordering as 
long as all possible combinations are included) for all thirty-six 
“profiles.” The graphical “grid” approach provides a simplified 
reference.33 
Hansen offers a grid illustration of the choices with thirty-six “3 by 
3” boxes, two of which are shown in Figure 1, below. Again, there is no 
demand that any exact “profile” be called the “first” except that this 
figure is the simplest to understand. In “Profile 1,” Marshall ordinally 
ranks the three choices of x, y, and z in the following way: x is 1st, y is 
2nd, and z is 3rd. Keeping the variables alphabetical, Taney chooses the 















In the “Profile 7” illustration, Marshall makes the same choices as 
in Profile 1: x is 1st, y is 2nd, and z is 3rd. Taney, while coincidentally 
choosing x as the 1st preference, differs on the remaining choices: Taney 
chooses z as 2nd, and y as 3rd.34  
Figure 2, below, details the complete list of “boxes.” Again, the 
thirty-six profiles correspond to all possible outcomes for a decision 
made between Marshall’s and Taney’s ordinally-ranked preferences 
                                                                                                             
 30 Combinatorial math would use the following equation: 3! x 3! = 36 profiles. 
 31 See Figure 1. 
 32 See Figure 2. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Figure 1. 
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among choices x, y, and z. The important matter is determining outcomes 
for all thirty-six potential preference profiles.35 To complete this next 
task, the Article applies the five Arrovian assumptions and examines the 
consequences. 
First, Range is satisfied in all thirty-six profiles because at least 
three choices exist in this universe. Second, assume that Non-dictatorship 
exists. Soon, it becomes apparent that Non-dictatorship is the proof’s 
“punch-line”—it must exist due to the remaining constraints of 
Transitivity, Independence, and Pareto. Profile 1 can be used to 
demonstrate the impact of the Transitivity, Independence, and Pareto 
constraints. 
In Profile 1, determining the outcome is simple because the work is 
done due to the Pareto principle. The Pareto principle mandates ranking x 
as the unanimous first preference, y as the unanimous second, and z as 
the unanimous third preference. Applying this to the grid, there is no 
dispute whatsoever between Marshall and Taney. The final ordering of 
xyz is thus the actual outcome, should these be the actual choices made 
by both Marshall and Taney. The potential result is thus determined ex 
ante, i.e., before an actual vote has taken place. That is, if the actual 
preferences of Marshall and Taney are known, one could determine the 
outcome of the vote for Profile 1 before the group’s decision is made. 
Superscripts attached to the unanimous preferences in the boxes are 
a reminder of the unanimous outcome, and the successful outcome for 
Profile 1 is x1y2z3. In profiles 2 through 6 of Figure 2, all possible choices 
are ranked for Marshall and Taney. Again, these are the “outcomes” if, 
and only if, Marshall and Taney actually make the decisions represented 
in that respective profile.  
The outcomes for the possible decision-scenarios made by these 
two can be determined until Profile 7. At that profile, there is a problem: 
Marshall and Taney disagree on a final outcome of z versus y.36 Both 
agree that x is first, so that characteristic of the outcome is settled due to 
Pareto. However, it must be determined whether y or z should be second 
in the final outcome, as well as which choice should be third. Since the 
decision function demands an output due to a Completeness 
assumption,37 an arbitrary choice is made between these two individuals. 
                                                                                                             
 35 Consider this example parallel to choosing the victor among three politicians or 
which of three flavors of ice cream the two will eat, etc. 
 36 The key to grasping the intuition in Hansen’s proof is the depiction of two letters 
southwest-northeast of each other (i.e., ** ) which shows agreement, while northwest-
southeast (i.e., **) shows disagreement. This visual depiction is useful in easily finding 
disagreements between Marshall and Taney. Resolution of the disagreements determines 
who will inevitably be the dictator. 
 37 Completeness is a characteristic inherent in the transitivity principle. 
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If Profile 7’s output is x1y2z3, Marshall’s ranking “wins.” Taney may 
“win” just as rightfully, but a successful outcome for Profile 7 is 
obtained when Marshall is chosen. But there are consequences—this 
arbitrary choice now affects other profiles due to the assumptions of 
Transitivity, Pareto, and, most importantly, the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives.38 
According to the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
assumption, any value judgment imposed by the social choice rule to 
resolve one particular preference conflict must hold for all other profiles. 
Consider a profile disagreement visually depicted in two-dimensional 
space as yz. That depiction means Marshall prefers y to z, and Taney the 
opposite. If yz is resolved as yPz in the outcome for any one preference 
profile, all yz tensions must resolve as yPz in remaining profiles.39 The 
third choice, x, may be placed before, after, or even between these two 
choices. Choice x’s position depends on Marshall’s and Taney’s full 
range of preferences. Regardless, Independence has made its demand: 
the result of the yz tension holds true for all profiles where this particular 
disagreement exists. The outcome yPz must be kept intact for all profiles 
when that exact tension occurs. This demonstrates the “Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives” restriction at work. 
The “Independence” assumption is not the only critical restriction. 
The transitive property makes demands as well. In Profile 9 of Figure 2, 
the yz tension (yPz) exists along with a universally accepted zPx. The yPz 
determination (made due to “Independence” and Profile 7’s arbitrary 
choice among y and z) forces transitivity to demand the ultimate outcome 
yPzPx (or y1z2x3) for this profile.40 
                                                                                                             
 38 This arbitrary choice may be made in Profile 7 or any other profile that contains a 
disagreement. The Independence assumption will still force the outcome to “trickle-
down” through other profiles. 
 39 This yz tension is resolved yPz no matter whether choice x comes “between” y or z, 
or universally before, or after, y and z. 
 40 Hansen explains:  
“In Profile 7 . . . although [Marshall and Taney] agree that x comes first, (and 
therefore by the Pareto principle, it must head Profile 7’s social ordering), they 
disagree in their second and third placings of y and z. Recall, the only 
information available is the individuals’ rankings of alternatives and not the 
strengths of their preferences [this would be cardinal]. Suppose (arbitrarily) that 
[Marshall] is favored so that [his] preference yz prevails and y is socially 
ranked ahead of z, and hence Profile 7’s social ordering is determined as xyz 
(given x is first via Pareto). The key issue henceforth is the application of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption introduced in the 
previous section.”   
Paul Hansen, Another Graphical Proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, 33 J. ECON. 
EDUC. 217, 221–22 (June 2002).  
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Throughout this process, a single arbitrary decision in Profile 7 
“trickles-down” in all thirty-six preference profiles. One might compare 
this analysis of the outcomes to the popular Sudoku game, where very 
few arbitrary decisions lead to a complete solution for the entire puzzle. 
Yet here, only one arbitrary decision is required for a determination of 
the entire puzzle. The key is the severity of the four assumptions of 
Range, Transitivity, Pareto, and particularly Independence. After 
working through the disagreements, the algorithm provides results as 
stated below each profile.41 
With all of the boxes filled in, an examination reveals that, 
coincidentally, all of Marshall’s preferences exactly match the output 
function results. This occurred because of the influence from the four 
assumptions of Pareto, Range, Transitivity, Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives, plus one arbitrary decision. That single arbitrary decision 
could have been made among any tension, and would similarly have 
“trickled down” through the demands the four assumptions made on the 
outcomes in other profiles.42 The key to the inter-profile demands is the 
Independence assumption. In the end, Marshall is the “Arrovian 
dictator.”43 
Consequently, Non-dictatorship is violated, arbitrariness exists (if 
not thrives), and majority rule will certainly fail, albeit at unpredictable 
times. Political and ethical norms preclude these characteristics in a 
voting mechanism. Thus, the concept becomes Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem.44 
                                                                                                             
 41 See Figure 2. 
 42 For example, one could have chosen Taney’s preferences over Marshall’s in 
Profile 7 and the consequence would be the same. 
 43 “In general, therefore, when a value judgment that corresponds to neither 
individual’s ranking is initially imposed (thereby immediately ruling out a dictatorship), 
it is impossible to socially order all thirty-six preference profiles because of an inevitable 
intransitivity.” Hansen, supra note 27, at 230. Notably, Taney could have been the 
dictator as well, if the arbitrary decision had favored Taney. 
 44 See also Allen M. Feldman & Roberto Serrano, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: 
Two Simple Single-Profile Versions, (Brown University Dept. of Econ. Working Paper 
No. 2006–11 (2006)) (showing how the four assumptions can work together in examples 
that remove each assumption, through one example and one assumption at a time). 
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ii. Groups of Greater Than Two Individuals 
The Article demonstrates that if only two individuals are 
responsible for a decision and they follow the Arrovian scheme, then one 
of the two individuals becomes a dictator. In Figure 2, Marshall is a 
dictator because Marshall’s preferences perfectly coincided with every 
possible outcome the decision function could make. The precursor to the 
proof is that Range must exist (i.e., there must be at least three choices). 
It follows then, that the Independence assumption, Pareto, and 
Transitivity (and its necessary complement, Completeness) restrict 
outcomes in such a way that only Marshall’s desires (or perhaps only 
Taney’s desires) compose the ultimate outcomes. Thus, Non-dictatorship 
fails. Critically, the result of who eventually becomes the dictator is 
arbitrary. 
Attempting to illustrate the preceding proof with more than two 
individuals becomes much more complex. The number of profiles that 
will come into play is significantly higher. For three individuals and 
three choices, 216 profiles would be necessary.45 Following the forced 
choices due to Independence, Transitivity, and Pareto is more difficult to 
illustrate. It is possible to show “depth” or the “z-axis” on the grid with a 
three-dimensional illustration using superscripts. The following 
subsections offer an alternative based on Condorcet’s Paradox. The proof 
in the preceding subsection provides the basis for the intuitition: an 
arbitrary choice is made and the consequences of that choice affect all 
outcomes. Most significantly, the Independence assumption forces other 
profiles to obey the arbitrary decision. 
A. A Majority Rule Problem: Condorcet’s Paradox 
If a third member now enters the group, this will force an 
examination of the tension between the Independence assumption and 
the fundamental democratic tenet of majority rule. However, before 
examining the proof with three individuals, a majority rule problem must 
be acknowledged. The majority rule problem is called Condorcet’s 
Paradox.46 Condorcet’s Paradox refers to the occurrence of a “cycle” 
created by three or more individuals who attempt to use democratic 
voting. Condorcet’s insight was that majority rule can fail to provide a 
clear victor. There may be no majority outcome uncontested by another 
                                                                                                             
 45 For two individuals who have three choices, thirty-six profiles are required to fully 
understand the “trickle-down” effects of Pareto, Transitivity, and Independence (3! x 3! = 
36, where 3! = 3 x 2 x 1). For three individuals who have three choices, 216 profiles are 
necessary to account for all possible permutations (3! x 3! x 3! = 216). 
 46 Arrow, supra note 17. 
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majority. For example, imagine three individuals: Ben, Jerry, and Carvel, 
where one choice must be made for all: chocolate, vanilla, or strawberry 
ice cream (abbreviated as “c,” “v,” and “s”). Suppose Ben ranks the 
choices as c, v, s; Jerry ranks the choices as v, s, c; and Carvel ranks the 
choices as s, c, v: 
 
 Rank: 1st 2nd 3rd
Ben  c v s 
Jerry  v s c 
Carvel  s c v 
 
The majority’s wishes are in complete conflict with one another. 
Majority rule fails to provide a winning answer. Specifically, chocolate 
should not win because a majority (two persons to one person) prefers 
strawberry to chocolate. Vanilla should not win because a majority 
prefers chocolate to vanilla, again by a vote of two to one. Lastly, 
strawberry should not win because a majority prefers vanilla to 
strawberry, two to one. Therefore, chocolate is preferred to vanilla, and 
vanilla is preferred to strawberry, and strawberry is preferred to 
chocolate. This could be represented as: (Chocolate) P (Vanilla) P 
(Strawberry) P (Chocolate). However, the result presents a problem. 
If one attempted to solve this through pair-wise voting (i.e., only 
allow a vote on two flavors at a time), a cycle still exists: chocolate beats 
vanilla in the first run-off. Next, strawberry beats chocolate. In the third 
run-off, vanilla beats strawberry. This transitivity failure is referred to as 
a “democratic cycle.”47 
B. Begin with Condorcet’s Paradox and Apply Completeness 
Returning to the Arrovian proof, assume three individuals, 
Marshall, Taney, and Chase, ordinally rank the three choices of x, y, and 
z. Condorcet’s Paradox exists where the majority vote results in a cycle; 
no one agrees on any position. Specifically, of the 216 possible profiles 
in this scenario, six profiles present this problem.48 These six profiles 
                                                                                                             
 47 For more on cycling, including an insightful illustration of cycling with a five-
ninths majority rule, an 89% majority rule, a unanimity rule, and the resolution of cycles 
through homogeneity, see MUELLER, supra note 23, at 99–101. For more on homogeneity 
and Arrow, see generally Feldman & Serrano, supra note 44 (discussing simple and 
complex diversity in conjunction with Arrow’s proof). 
 48 See Figure 3. 
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account for approximately 3% of the 216 outcomes we might expect to 
occur if the group is to make a decision among these choices.49 
 
Individual Condorcet Paradox Profiles: 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Marshall  xyz  xyz  yzx  yzx  zxy  zxy 
 Taney  zxy  yzx  xyz  zxy  xyz  yzx 




Placed into a grid-framework, Figure 3’s first column of 
preferences would appear like the following, where the superscripts 
represent Chase’s preferences. (See Figure 4)50 
       
          Taney 
 y1  
x3   
  z2 
           1             2              3      Marshall 
 
Figure 4 
(Chase’s preferences are represented by superscripts.) 
 
To decide which individual wins among the three completely 
unique preference sets is to arbitrarily pick a solution that will affect 
outcomes for all other decision-scenarios. Yet this must be done 
according to Transitivity’s “Completeness” requirement: some outcome 
must succeed. 
Following Feldman and Serrano’s analysis,51 first, acknowledge 
that Completeness means there must be an outcome. No tie or lack of a 
decision is acceptable. Next, assume some majority will win, so a 2-1 
vote must occur, at the very least. Now, assume xPy. It does not matter 
where one begins. Examine the votes in the first Condorcet Paradox 
(again, one could start with any of them). In this first example, note that 
                                                                                                             
 49 This ~3% figure is not insignificant if the group, for example, makes hundreds or 
thousands of decisions per year, or even 80–110, as in the case of the Supreme Court. 
 50 The superscripts add a “third dimension” that a two-dimensional diagram cannot 
easily represent. Also, note that this is a different use of superscripts from Figures 1 and 2 
above. 
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Marshall and Taney each individually voted xPy. It can be safely 
concluded that these two must be the decisive majority. Part of the entire 
group’s decision (a decision demanded by Completeness) is xPy. 
Marshall and Taney are the majority. Considering z versus x, there are 
two potential options: 
First, perhaps z is preferred, or even simply ties with x. If this were 
the case, since the group deems xPy, then Transitivity demands zPy. This 
means Chase’s preference of zPx was important in the decision, which 
contradicts the original assumption of who was in the decisive majority. 
The dissenter, Chase, has votes that actually impact the outcome, so he 
must be part of it. Why? The contradiction is forced by the assumptions, 
demonstrating a breakdown in the decision-making mechanism. So in the 
first alternative, it is impossible for the three to follow the rules. 
Examining the second alternative, if there is no “tie” between z and 
x, nor a victor of zPx, then the result is xPz. This is problematic, because 
Marshall’s choices are preferred in the face of contrary preferences made 
by both Taney and Chase. We thus have an Arrovian dictator: Marshall. 
Arrow’s proof demands one of the conditions must be relaxed, and in 
this second scenario, it is Non-dictatorship.52 
Throughout the profiles, the Independence, Pareto, and Transitivity 
assumptions “trickle-down” to force certain choices, thus sealing the fate 
of the decision-making mechanism. Who actually wins is not the key; the 
relevant factor is that the winner was arbitrarily chosen (i.e., no majority 
vote applied—simply the inherent Arrovian dictator’s decisions). 
The trickle-down effect functions the same way it did in the 
discussion of the two-person vote in the analysis of Profile 7 from Figure 
1, above. Like in the prior example, when one of the three individuals’ 
unique preferences sets wins, effects of the Independence Transitivity 
and Pareto assumptions trickle-down here through all 216 profiles. 
Similar to the example involving two people, the seemingly incongruous 
result is that the majority vote will not always result in a victory for that 
majority. Even two-to-one votes will result in outcomes where the lone 
dissenter’s preferences match the actual outcome. For example, when 
Marshall and Taney completely agree on the ordering of x, y, and z 
(which will occur thirty-six times in the 216 profiles, or 16.67% of the 
                                                                                                             
 52 The focus of this Article is not on the intricacies of Arrow’s Proof; for further 
discussion about the proof, see generally MUELLER, supra note 23; Arrow, supra note 17; 
Vickrey, supra note 26; Hansen, supra note 17; Alex Tabarrok, Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem, 8–9, (2005), mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/arrowstheorem.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 
2008); and Feldman & Serrano, supra note 44 (explaining why Arrow survives 
Samuelson’s arguments, and showing how to relax one assumption at a time). 
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time), Chase will disagree with both, and could win a 1-2 vote in thirty 
(83.33%) of these thirty-six profiles, should Chase be the dictator. 
In Figure 4, above, each possible outcome complies with only one 
individual’s preferences. The tensions are resolved on the arbitrary 
decisions made when no majority rule exists. In this Condorcet Paradox 
representation, Independence applies its tension resolution demand to the 
other profiles. The result again is a dictator. Since Non-dictatorship has 
failed, Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem applies to groups of not only two 
voters, but also three or more voters with equal weight. 
The three-member example does not violate Pareto because there is 
no unanimous positioning in a Condorcet Paradox. To reiterate, in a 
Condorcet Paradox consider a profile where chocolate beats vanilla, 
which beats strawberry, which beats chocolate. This situation does not 
violate Transitivity because there is no conclusion about which profile 
ranks ahead of another profile in a cycle. There is no presumption that 
xPy is used with conclusion yPz to mandate xPz. Thus, nothing exists for 
Transitivity to operate upon. Because of the Independence assumption, 
Marshall and Taney must conform to Chase’s desires, or Marshall and 
Chase to Taney’s, or Taney and Chase to Marshall’s desires. All produce 
an unacceptable result according to majority rule—one vote will defeat 
two votes. The culmination that occurs when all profiles are ordered 
under Arrow’s criteria is a final result of Arrovian dictatorship. 
The Condorcet Paradox problem and Transitivity’s Completeness 
characteristic illustrate that the dictator defeats a majority vote. Since an 
outcome was demanded among conflicts where there was no majority, a 
dictator must have existed. The dictator was chosen arbitrarily, 
discovered among equal shares in a three-way tie. Current American 
social norms do not allow this in the political process when, for example, 
choosing an elected representative. If the dictator was not chosen 
arbitrarily, but purposefully, why was there a group decision in the first 
instance? 
Since a Condorcet Paradox exists for three persons or three million 
persons and higher, the decisive outcome will always devolve to one 
arbitrary decision among any number of individuals, leaving one person, 
even among millions, as an Arrovian dictator in group decisions. In 
conclusion, the core intuition of the two-person proof applies to groups 
of greater than two persons—one dictator exists for arbitrary reasons.53 
                                                                                                             
 53 For an alternative proof using a popular “boxes in boxes” metaphor, see MUELLER, 
supra note 23, at 584–85 (citing William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social Decision 
Rules, 74 Q.J. ECON. 507, 507–35 (Nov. 1960)). In the proof, a “decisive” group 
successfully controls the outcome among several choices; subsequently, that group is 
divided into two groups and the process repeats until the decisive group for all 
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This Article previously explained how Completeness demanded an 
arbitrary decision. The arbitrary decision operates to make demands on 
all other possibilities primarily through the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives characteristic. As a result, majority rule fails, and a dictator 
exists. Condorcet’s Paradox, Completeness, and the tension between 
Independence and the majority rule illustrate the impact of Arrow’s proof 
for voting between two persons or more. 
C. Relaxing Postulates 
The intuition behind Arrow’s proof should now be clearer—
following Arrovian assumptions assures a failure in the decision 
mechanism. To solve the problem, one assumption must be “relaxed,”54 
or else, as demonstrated above, an arbitrary decision among ordinal 
preferences will inevitably lead to an arbitrarily-chosen dictator. If the 
choice is not arbitrary, then there is no need for a group.  
The Independence assumption is the most controversial aspect of 
the Theorem; consequently, scholars typically suggest that it should be 
the first assumption relaxed.55 Further examination of the Independence 
principle reveals two characteristics: (1) changes in the set of variables 
considered may not alter ordinal preference rankings (i.e., if xPyPz and 
remove y, there should still exist xPz); and, more importantly, (2) 
Independence implies that a voting system can only respond to ordinal 
information about preferences.56 The first implied principle means if one 
were asked to choose an apple, a banana, or an orange, one’s preferences 
between any two may not change after the removal of one of the choices. 
This implication should be viewed skeptically. It is not clearly necessary 
for a “fair” voting mechanism, as the Article later seeks to address. 
An example of the second implication is if one were asked to select 
an apple, a banana, or an orange to eat, but is not permitted to explain 
                                                                                                             
alternatives is found to be one individual. Thus, the principle that one person makes all 
decisions violates the Non-dictatorship assumption. For another important proof 
“uncovering the dictator,” see Alan P. Kirmanand & Dieter Sondermann, Arrow’s 
Theorem, Many Agents, and Invisible Dictators, 5 Q.J. ECON. 267, 267–77 (Oct. 1972) 
(proving that one dictator exists even with infinite numbers of voters). 
 54 The term “relax” in this context means to either partly, or perhaps completely 
reduce the constraints mandated by the Arrovian assumption. 
 55 Tabarrok, supra note 52. 
 56 Id. Tabarrok notes there is confusion among economists about why there are in 
fact two implications to Independence. This confusion is mentioned for the benefit of 
readers who may have seen alternative explanations written elsewhere. The discrepancy 
is due, in part, because Arrow himself mathematically defined one implication yet 
explained the meaning of the second implication in his 1951 paper. Some authors only 
focus on one of the implications, as with Mueller’s 1989 Public Choice text. Id. at 6. 
However, this discussion does not. 
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how much any one fruit is desired over another. The selector must 
simply rank the choices as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd. An alternative, but currently 
prohibited idea, is to allow the selector to rank the preferences 
cardinally. This means the selector would be able to explain how much 
he desired one product over the other; the apple might be worth ten, and 
the banana and orange two and one, respectively.57 
Tabarrok states that Independence is often defended pragmatically, 
and that the Independence criterion requires individuals to tell the truth.58 
Some argue that without Independence, it “would be too difficult” to 
ascertain true cardinal values about preferences.59 These defenses should 
be dismissed. A theoretician’s “ease of use” is no reason to demand the 
severe restrictions imposed by Independence. 
A second defense is that it appears paradoxical that dropping a 
losing choice “z” may lead to a different winner. Tabarrok explains that 
these arguments will not suffice.60 Using choices from the 1992 U.S. 
Presidential election, for example, demonstrates the problem with 
majority rule and dropping “choice z.” The 1992 U.S. Presidential 
election offered three prominent choices: Clinton, Bush, and Perot. 
Though the U.S. Presidential election is not based on popular vote, the 
popular vote hypothetical provides an appropriate illustration.  
The Independence criterion implies that the preference between 
Clinton and Bush is independent of Perot’s presence in the race. 
However, if Perot receives 18% of the popular vote, Clinton receives 
43%, and Bush receives 39%, then Perot’s presence might make a 
difference. Without Perot in the race, where do the Perot votes “go?” The 
popular vote result was (Clinton) P (Bush) P (Perot) when Perot was in 
the race. It should be understandable that, again on popular vote, (Bush) 
P (Clinton) is possible with Perot out of the race. The latter result would 
                                                                                                             
 57 The unit of reference is not important: it could be ten dollars, ten yen, or ten 
bananas. However, there is a problem of “normalizing” cardinal preferences, which is 
discussed in Part V. Borrowing from science and mathematics, “normalizing” serves to 
enable comparisons based on comparable units. One may compare feet, inches, and 
centimeters because these measurements can be objectively compared through a simple 
algorithm. Without this normalization, we are colloquially comparing “apples to 
oranges.” 
 58 Tabarrok, supra note 52. Independence must apply because without it, theorists 
have no idea when individuals are using strategy to ensure that their second favorite 
preference wins. Howard Chang explains Independence as a pragmatic solution. See 
Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173 (2000). Although the article discusses social welfare, the 
criticism of the Independence condition is the same. Chang suggests this pragmatic 
appeal is the collective focus, but asserts Independence is not clearly necessary for 
“fairness” in society. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Tabarrok, supra note 52. 
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occur if Bush received greater than two-thirds of Perot’s votes.61 This 
represents a 12% “swing” from Perot’s 18%. Bush would then defeat 
Clinton because 51% is greater than 49%.62 
Utilizing the preceding example of ordinal versus cardinal 
distinctions, the mandate of ordinal rankings and the Independence 
assumption that demands the use of ordinal rankings should both be 
viewed skeptically. A group making a decision should not be forced into 
these problems simply because Independence “seems” right. 
Independence should not be relaxed even if the assumption is 
problematic. The ultimate resolution is that there is no good answer and 
this is, in fact, the assumption we should relax. Yet before simply 
accepting this, the Article will examine several more defenses of the 
Independence assumption. 
Arrow himself defended Independence as a reasonable axiom 
because a decision-making system with this characteristic ensures an 
“appealing” result ex ante.63 However, the Independence principle is 
quite restrictive—in fact perhaps more so than the Pareto principle.64 As 
Tabarrok and Chang note, the Independence restriction is controversial.65 
Chang suggests (perhaps without being convinced by the idea) that there 
is pragmatic appeal. He explains that because there are large information 
costs in analyzing alternatives, society must invest scarce public 
resources in public choices.66 The simplified process using Independence 
may reduce the costs of operating a voting system. Further, the 
                                                                                                             
 61 This Article uses 12% as the key variable, but actually the figure is one vote more 
than 11.00%. This change would create the necessary “swing” between Bush and Clinton 
where Perot is not running. 
 62 As another example, the 2000 U.S. Presidential election generated scrutiny for the 
electoral votes in Florida. According to the 2000 Federal Election Commission results, 
Bush received less than 600 votes over Gore, but many of Nader’s 97,000(+) votes would 
probably have supported Gore if Nader had not run. A bare majority of Nader’s votes, 
50.0001%, would have given Gore the critical difference. Thus, the idea that 
Independence should be seen as an entirely palatable constraint is not clearly correct. See 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/prespop.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2007). For a “pop-
culture” reference to this voting problem, consider a debate in the film industry regarding 
Marisa Tomei’s Best Supporting Oscar win for the film “My Cousin Vinny” as another 
“failure” in democratic voting. This could also be a “failure” of the Independence 
postulate. See http://movies.msn.com/movies/oscars2007/surprises (last visited Jan. 5, 
2008). 
 63 Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the 
Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 226 (2000). 
 64 Id. at 228. 
 65 Id. at 229. 
 66 Id. at 229–30. 
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alternative requires determining cardinal utilities of all individuals, 
which is a task that is currently not attainable.67 
These suggestions are too vague when the positive problem of 
cycling is so readily present. Perot, Nader, and strawberry are relevant to 
elections because the presence of each affects the respective election’s 
outcome. The issue remains as to which remaining candidate receives the 
votes for Perot, Nader, or strawberry when those choices are dropped 
from the contest. “Ease of use” should not be accepted as a sufficient 
rationale touting the necessity of the Independence principle. For society 
to purposefully ignore the third choice is to irrationally ignore what is 
profoundly relevant. Therefore, since Independence has such 
unappealing consequences, the assumption should remain a viable option 
to be relaxed. 
Next consider the consequences of relaxing alternative Arrovian 
assumptions. This Article suggests that it is infeasible to consider 
whether Non-dictatorship or the Pareto principle should be relaxed. First, 
allowing Non-dictatorship to be relaxed would mean it is ethically 
palatable to have a single individual in the Senate, the House of 
Representatives, or on the Supreme Court controlling the results of that 
body. A problem which readily presents itself is who to choose? Perhaps 
Justice X is a highly esteemed and competent arbiter, but should the 
Justice, picked ex ante, speak for all nine Justices forever? Or only this 
term? Or only for a certain case? The reasonable conclusion that follows 
this logic indicates that Non-dictatorship cannot be relaxed. 
Moreover, the idea of relaxing the Pareto constraint is without 
promise. If 100 members of the Senate intend to vote for a certain policy, 
it appears completely absurd to prohibit that policy’s enactment. Yet this 
would have to occur at times if Pareto were relaxed instead of one of the 
other assumptions. Specifically, outcome zyx may occur when all 100 
votes go to alternate xyz in order to refute Non-dictatorship. A clear 
majority rule victor by 100% vote would not be a permissible outcome in 
a percentage of the scenarios.68 
                                                                                                             
 67 The cardinal utilities determination problem is, colloquially, the problem of 
attempting to weigh “apples and oranges.”  For example, if I say policy x is worth twenty, 
and A says the policy is worth nine, how do we know which is greater?  We do not, 
because we cannot compare subjective perceptions of utility. This is the problem of 
weighing cardinal utilities. See MUELLER, supra note 23, at 590–91, 595–96. 
 68 For example, in Figure 2, supra, one of the Profiles 1 through 6 must fail among 
two individuals if Pareto is relaxed. All y z tensions would resolve as yPz due to 
Independence. Transitivity forces multiple outcomes, as well. Range is satisfied because 
there are at least three choices. What remains are Profiles 1 through 6 and the question of 
whether Non-dictatorship will be met in this case where Pareto is relaxed. Unless one of 
those six outcomes does not comport with the unanimous votes, an Arrovian dictator 
exists, thus violating Non-dictatorship. 
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Mueller asks whether Transitivity may be relaxed, and says this is 
possible, but it will either (1) produce an oligarchy, or (2) would simply 
need a new ethical norm that accepts arbitrariness and inconsistency. 
Currently, our ethical norms and laws assert constitutional protections 
against such characteristics.69 As an example, consider a situation where 
100 members of the Senate find xPy, regardless of their ranking of 
choice z. The existence of an outcome of yPz seems absurd. Further, it is 
unpredictable when this should occur, except to conclude that it is 
controlled by the other four assumptions of Pareto, Non-dictatorship, 
Range, and Independence. Thus, relaxing Transitivity is infeasible as 
well. 
The final option is relaxing Range, that is, limiting choices to less 
than three. First, there is the problem of limiting all choices to two 
options. This cannot occur. Any proposal to limit options to two 
inherently fails Arrow’s proof. Put another way, there is no method to 
select the mechanism to reduce the options. This is not only itself an 
inherent Range problem (as there are surely more than two ways of 
limiting a choice to two options), but there is also the complication of 
appointing the initial agenda setter if choices are made among pairs. In 
the Range problem, an Arrovian dictator controls the group decision 
about how to limit the options to two choices. This dictator is itself the 
original problem. The latter problem is the “agenda control” problem, 
where an individual who decides how to choose pairs may strategically 
control the outcome.  
The second alternative is to have someone choose among two 
options, then pit the winner against the third afterwards, repeating this 
for all choices until one “winner” exists. If attempted, Condorcet’s 
Paradox may lead to “agenda control.” To reiterate, Condorcet’s Paradox 
is the name given to the occurrence of a “cycle” created by three or more 
individuals who attempt to use a democratic voting in a unique but not 
necessarily rare scenario. Agenda control is the use of a strategy when a 
group uses its authority to personally benefit from the situation. Recall 
the cycling example above of chocolate, vanilla, and strawberry. 
Although strawberry defeats chocolate, a committee head could 
undermine the process by never asking this question. Rather, transitivity 
is assumed, mistakenly, to prove that chocolate wins since chocolate 
                                                                                                             
 69 See, e.g., Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1974) (emphasizing that the 
“touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of 
government” (citations omitted)); Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(invalidating, due to “arbitrariness,” the S.E.C.’s hedge fund rule determining that the 
word “client” has different meanings in different parts of the same act. Chevron 
deference did not provide sufficient agency protection). 
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defeats vanilla which beats strawberry. With this possibility in mind, a 
committee head with agenda control could raise issues strategically in 
pair-wise voting. The committee head would ensure the defeat of issues 
that would certainly defeat his own preferences. Thus, limiting Range is 
infeasible. Not only is the mechanism of limiting range an inherent 
Arrovian problem, but it also may lead to agenda control issues. 
Some argue, however, that limiting Range to two issues at times 
will benefit society, for legal issues such standing, certiorari, and 
jurisdiction stripping.70 The feasibility of limiting range is discussed in 
Parts III and IV. At this point, the Article has articulated how groups 
experience decision-making problems.71 The impact of these lessons on 
the legislature and the judiciary are explored next. 
 
III. DOES ARROW PRECLUDE LEGISLATIVE INTENT? 
Statutory and constitutional interpretation is grounded in multiple 
jurisprudential issues. Broadly, the law’s meaning may be derived from 
three places: (1) the text itself, (2) the intent behind the text, and (3) the 
judge (as law-reader and law-giver). 
A. Legislative Intent and the Limits for Interpretivism 
This Article assumes that, when searching for the liberal project’s 
Rule of Law, intentionalism is the high water mark for judicial authority 
in statutory interpretation cases because it offers the most restriction. The 
                                                                                                             
 70 Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) (arguing that limiting range is a reason for the 
standing doctrine). 
 71 The Arrovian conditions are extremely easy to misinterpret, partly because much 
of the language in the proof connotes powerful ideas. A mathematical “dictator” in the 
proof is quite different than the political version the word normally implies. The 
Independence condition seems extremely palatable and appealing (perhaps for Chang’s 
pragmatic reasons), but is actually quite a severe restriction on decision-making. Some 
commentators incorrectly understand Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: 
(1) “[D]emocratic decisions that meet certain basic criteria [referring to Arrovian 
assumptions] are not derivable from any process free from arbitrary or undemocratic 
constraints on social choice.”  Ronald A Cass, Looking with One Eye Closed: The 
Twilight of Administrative Law, DUKE L.J. 238, 245 (1986) (emphasis added). Rather, 
there are processes that function—today—in legislatures which allow cardinal bargaining 
and thus relax Independence. 
(2) “The Impossibility Theorem is that legislative outcomes may not reflect a coherent 
outcome because the outcome chosen depends on the order different proposals are 
considered.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. 
L. REV. 405, 508, n.148 (1989). This is the voting paradox developed by Condorcet and 
further studied by Arrow, and is not Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. The Impossibility 
Theorem instead concerns ordinal rankings in conjunction with the five Arrovian 
assumptions. 
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judiciary must act as the legislature’s agent unless there is a conflict with 
the state or federal constitution. In such a case, the judiciary acts as the 
agent for that constitution. In this way judges might “apply” the laws 
intended for them rather than “actively legislate” from the bench.  
Legal hermeneutics commentators correctly argue that textualism 
does not act as a further limiting mechanism for statutory interpretation 
issues. These commentators reason that there are infinite potential 
meanings for pure text.72 In the simplest example, “cane” may have a 
meaning depending on the language. In English the text may signal a tool 
used to aid someone walking; in Italian it may mean dog. As Levinson 
explained, “[t]here are as many plausible readings of the United States 
Constitution as there are versions of Hamlet, even though each 
interpreter, like each director, might genuinely believe that he or she has 
stumbled onto the one best answer to the conundrums of the texts.”73   
Theoretically there are infinite possible meanings for any text, 
which are only interpreted into an order through context. However, using 
context means to use something other than text, and is invalid under 
“pure” textualism. Thus, out of infinite possible meanings in a text, 
judges cannot reliably find the Rule of Law. As no objectively correct 
answer exists, the bounds are limited to “reasonableness,” which 
provides no objective principles to “apply.”74 
This article assumes that it is impermissible for judges to determine 
intent themselves since that would mean the law-interpreter, or law-
reader, is the law-giver. There, a judge is correct in an interpretation 
simply because the judge has power. Subjective power should not be 
allowed to create the Rule of Law either. 
An alternative is to decide cases according to “neutral principles.” 
Mark Tushnet has discredited this position as mandating a “presumed 
shared understanding of the role of judicial reasoning in our polity.”75 
Tushnet argues that such a proposition is false—there is no presumed 
shared understanding. Others have similarly commented that any 
                                                                                                             
 72 The text itself must be an inappropriate place from which to derive meaning. 
Wittgenstein comments how rules do not determine their own application, while Kelsen 
and H.L.A. Hart show that the status of a text cannot ultimately be determined by the text 
itself. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Supremacy: A 
Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 460–61 (2000). 
 73 Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982). 
 74 According to Fuller’s famous case, all interpreters are “correct.” Lon L. Fuller, The 
Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
 75 Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983). 
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assertion finding neutral principles is inherently flawed by the subjective 
suggestion of what is neutral.76 
What remains is legislative intent, which becomes a necessary 
guide the judiciary relies on to interpret and decide cases.77 Without 
legislative intent, statutory interpretation issues are left to some other 
presumably inappropriate power. The focus of this Article thus shifts to 
examine how “[t]he text only remains an object of interpretation . . . if 
what the text is and what it means are determined by the author’s 
intention.”78 Consequently, there is a critical importance in finding 
legislative intent. 
B. What is Legislative Intent? 
Legislative intent is clarified by Gerald MacCallum’s examination, 
which revealed that that the fundamental question, “What is legislative 
intent?” contains multiple questions, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
How did the legislator intend the words to be 
understood? 
What was the legislator’s intent in enacting the 
statute—i.e., “what did he intend the enactment to 
achieve,” versus “what did he intend the enactment to 
achieve in terms of his own career”? 
What is the difference between the legislature’s 
“intent” and intent of the several legislators? 
                                                                                                             
 76 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE, 218–19, 231 (Harvard University 
Press (2002)) (commenting that Dworkinism is inherently subjective). 
 77 A second definition of the Rule of Law that comports with these suggestions is that 
“[l]aw is a normative system backed by a credible threat of physical force against the 
violator of norms.”  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 266–67 (6th 
ed. 2003) (citing Hans Kelsen’s definition). Posner proposes that the Rule of Law must 
have “formal rationality” (Max Weber’s phrasing) which requires the following 
characteristics in addition to Kelsen’s: 
(1) a capability of being complied with by those to whom it is addressed; 
(2) must treat equally those who are similarly situated in all respects relevant to the 
command; 
(3) it must be public; and 
(4) there must be a procedure by which the truth of any facts necessary to the application 
of the command according to its terms is ascertained. 
Id. (adopting Kelsen, H., PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans. 1967); JOHN RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237–39 (Oxford University Press 1971)). 
 78 STEVEN KNAPP & WALTER B. MICHAELS, INTENTION, IDENTITY, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: A RESPONSE TO DAVID HOY, LEGAL HERMENEUTICS 187, 191 (Gregory 
Levh ed., 1992). 
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Was his intent to enact a statute—i.e., was the 
enacting not accidental or a mistake?79 
Do the words mean precisely what he supposed them 
to mean when he endorsed them?80 
For purposes of this Article, the issue is narrowed to MacCallum’s 
insight about legislative “meaning” versus “purpose.” The Article seeks 
some version of the former.81 The paramount issue here is not whether 
this proper “meaning” is (a) what a reasonable objective person would 
understand the intent to be, (b) the intent flowing from a compromise, or 
(c) something related to the psychology of a key legislator. What is 
important in the examination is that there may be something there to 
discover. The question that follows next is whether Arrow shows that the 
legislature cannot create such “intent,” and this Article concludes no. 
C. Arrow’s Theorem Will Not Disprove the Existence of Legislative 
Intent 
Some commentators incorrectly assert that Arrow’s Theorem 
disproves the existence of legislative intent. They are incorrect because 
they do not sufficiently analyze the “relaxation” of the assumptions. 
Certain examples of these commentators include: 
1. “[Arrow’s Theorem] implies that it is not possible to guarantee 
that a majority rule process will yield coherent choices.”82 This leads to 
“incoherence” that will “take the form of the nonexistence of a 
collectively ‘best’ alternative.”83 
                                                                                                             
 79 See, e.g., Shear, D., Va. Error Reinstates Blue Law, Workers Can Insist On 
Sundays Off, WASHINGTON POST, July 2, 2004, at A01. 
 80 MacCallum, Jr., Gerald C., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 755–59 (1965). 
 81 MacCallum himself did not conclude that one answer was correct. Rather, for him 
“[n]o one model of legislative intent is either so strongly or so weakly supported as to 
make its use either unproblematic or absurd.” 75 YALE L.J. at 786. For more discussion 
on how judges might find legislative intent, see, e.g., Zeppos, N., Legislative History and 
the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 
76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990) (arguing that perhaps collective intent is not intractably 
problematic and citing how the law finds that the collective actions of corporations may 
contain “intent” to discriminate). How to find intent is not important in this Article. The 
Article’s focus is that the judiciary’s group decisions cannot find intent objectively, and 
thus cannot determine one clear answer.  
 82 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a ‘They,’ Not an ‘It’: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241 (1992). 
 83 Id. 
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2. “Arrow’s Theorem reveals that, in theory, public decision 
making processes cannot be designed in ways that are fair and that 
preclude the possibility that decisions will cycle . . . .”84 
3. Then Professor, now Judge Easterbrook offered: “it turns out to 
be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists [of individual 
legislators’ preferences] into a coherent collective choice.”85 Easterbrook 
has argued that Arrow’s impossibility theorem shows how a judge cannot 
find and implement legislative intent.86  
According to Daniel Farber, Easterbrook “would . . . jettison the 
whole idea of legislative intent as a guide to interpretation,” in part due 
to Arrow.87 Easterbrook has continued to reason that since “there is no 
virtuous way to aggregate private wills into collective decisions,” then 
Arrow’s Theorem therefore shows that legislative compromises cannot 
be interpreted, as they have no single “common spirit.”88 He then 
concludes that “formalism” is the restrictive answer to this problem, so 
judges must ignore the idea of legislative intent. This Article concludes 
that Arrow does not mean legislative intent is a fiction. First, however, it 
reviews some alternative responses to these criticisms. 
Arthur Lupia and Mathew McCubbins state that using Arrow to 
make conclusions about legislative intent is an “exaggeration” of 
Arrow’s Theorem.89 They reason that Arrow’s assumptions are not 
necessarily principles “required for reasonable and fair democratic 
decision-making.”90 Rather, “fair” decision-making is not precluded 
unless one equates fairness with Arrow’s short list of conditions. The 
scholars further argue that Arrow’s Theorem is irrelevant to the 
                                                                                                             
 84 Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” 
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 483, 404 n.88 (1993). As another example of an incorrect understanding of 
“group choice,” see Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The 
Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 37 (1999) 
(attacking public choice normatively rather than showing how Arrow’s Theorem and 
cycling are misunderstood). 
 85 Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983). 
 86 Frank H. Easterbrook, Symposium: Changing Images of the State: The State of 
Madison’s Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328 
(1994). 
 87 Daniel A. Farber, and Phillip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 
VA. L. REV. 423 (1988). Farber further comments that Easterbrook’s concern is the 
“extent to which legislation reflects a coherent congressional view of the public interest.”  
Id. at 424. 
 88 Easterbrook, supra note 86, at 1339. 
 89 Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, New Perspectives on Statutory 
Interpretation: Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against 
Legislative Intent, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 585 (2005). 
 90 Id. 
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importance of legislative intent in statutory interpretation and is therefore 
misapplied in jurisprudence. However, Lupia and McCubbins fail to 
provide technical insight into why Arrow’s assumptions are not “fair.” 
Next, Farber argues that Arrow’s Theorem has been misunderstood, 
and is in fact normatively impotent for interpretative philosophers. 
Farber suggests instead that Arrow’s Theorem means the attempt to 
govern inevitably suffers from certain distortions, but this does not make 
any specific form of judicial interpretation a better answer over another. 
Farber analogizes this issue to the failure to make a completely accurate 
two dimensional map of a three dimensional world—something that does 
not prevent the usefulness of making maps. This is an interesting analogy 
but it is inconclusive as to what “should” occur in the legislature’s 
creation of statutes. 
Farber maintains that public choice supports a “pragmatic 
approach” to legislative intent, and nothing more. While Easterbrook’s 
position is that Arrow’s work “renders legislative outcomes suspect,”91 
Farber indicates that at most, less weight should rest on some 
background information and more on others.92 Rather than debunking the 
legislative process with cynicism toward political bodies, “public choice 
models can provide some insights into the realities of legislation and 
statutory interpretation, without at the same time destroying respect for 
democratic institutions.”93 Farber’s answer is more complete and thus 
better than Lupia and McCubbins’ answer. However, Hovenkamp  
furthers the analysis of legislatures. 
D. Hovenkamp: Independence Does Not Apply to Legislatures 
Herbert Hovenkamp provides the most sufficient and technically 
correct insight regarding the way legislatures operate. Hovenkamp posits 
that the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption is 
inapplicable to a legislature.94 When Independence is dropped, individual 
legislators logroll, filibuster, and bargain among political positions. 
Hovenkamp accurately states this “is no more ‘strategic’ than a person’s 
market-driven decision to purchase her second choice when she cannot 
                                                                                                             
 91 Farber, supra note 87, at 429. 
 92 Id. at 469. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 
75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 953 (1990). See also Herbet Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-being, 
and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 63, 90 (1990) (commenting that “[i]ndeterminacy . 
. . exists mostly at the margins” (Id. at 90); also commenting that Easterbrook overstates 
the Arrovian case (Id. at 116 n.66)). 
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afford her first.”95 Dropping Independence means legislatures “trade” 
cardinally rather than ordinally. This answer solves Arrow, as groups 
with equal voice can (and in fact do) use a “currency” to bargain. 
The “currency” is cardinalized bargaining, which may provide 
comparative advantages for all. According to James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock, there is a benefit to equal votes finding a means to trade 
cardinally: the invaluable resource of legislative powers may be traded 
among preferences, and thus a limited resource may be more efficiently 
used for the betterment of all.96  
For example, logrolling may create incentives for representatives 
“to act even with respect to matters in which they have very little 
interest.”97 The alternative is to leave groups stuck in an ordinal world 
where the supposed truth-telling benefit of the Independence assumption 
results in restricted choices that lead to a dictator and worse. These 
“worse” consequences exist because, as shown above in Part I, without 
the relaxation of Independence, another assumption must relax. Majority 
rule will certainly fail at arbitrary times, and whatever characteristic 
aside from Independence is relaxed, the consequence becomes an 
ethically unsound process that produces arbitrary results. Society 
condemns such arbitrary occurrences and this arbitrariness is 
constitutionally prohibited. 
Therefore, instead of rejecting acts of logrolling, these legislative 
bargains should be recognized not only as legitimate, but also as a 
necessary predicate for confidence in the legislature’s creation of 
statutes. Again, the issue of “how” to find the intent is suspended, and 
intentionalism is presumed to be the most restrictive form of 
interpretation when applying the Rule of Law. Without these bargains, 
statutory interpretation of legislative decision-making is a façade; no 
intent could possibly exist for a statute. Rather, the Rule of Law would 
be based only on the power of interpreters to cherry-pick among infinite 
meanings of pure text (textualism), pure power of interpreters (judge as 
law-giver), or guaranteed arbitrariness and a failure of majority rule in a 
political body (relaxation of any Arrovian assumption other than 
                                                                                                             
 95 Herbert Hovenkamp, Arrow’s Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 
75 IOWA L. REV. 949, 953 (1990). 
 96 On the importance and benefit of logrolling, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON 
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEMOCRACY 132–33 (1962) (explaining how logrolling moves toward Pareto optimality). 
See also David Crump, Game Theory, Legislation, and the Multiple Meanings of 
Equality, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 331 (2001) (suggesting logrolling is necessary to prevent 
cycling).  Buchanan won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1986, largely for this work. 
 97 Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local 
Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930, 968 (1988). 
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Independence). Thus, legislative bargains are the correct paths to 
creating legislative intent. There is no Herculean answer that Dworkin 
seeks, anywhere else in statutory interpretation theory. 
Perhaps the “most general theory of institutional failure,”98 Arrow 
has provided a convincingly positive analysis about the interaction 
between the legislature and the judiciary. So far, the Rule of Law is not 
prohibited through the Impossibility Theorem. It is not yet prohibited 
because it is, at least in theory, possible for legislative intent to exist. 
This possibility is not precluded by Arrow’s proof because the legislature 
relaxes Independence. 
The next issue then becomes: How will the judiciary, specifically 
the multi-member appellate courts, handle interpretive jurisprudence in 
light of Arrow’s proof? Part IV explores the troublesome positive 
instruction for interpretation. This problem is predominantly based on the 
Range and Independence assumptions. 
 
IV. MULTIMEMBER JUDICIAL DECISIONS 
This Article shows how a legislature may potentially create a 
collective “intent.” The prime focus is on the collective decision-making 
process of legislatures and courts to answer whether it is possible for the 
appellate courts to “apply” intentionalism in an objective manner, and 
this Article contends that it is not. 
Legislative intent may exist under Arrow’s Theorem utilizing a 
cardinal preference currency. In a cardinal bargaining currency, 
legislators accept and use mechanisms such as logrolling, filibusters, and 
earmarks to act on the legislator’s strength of preferences. In effect, the 
legislators trade for the limited resources that are other legislators’ votes. 
However, there are ethical considerations that consider vote-trading 
between judges as anathema to the Rule of Law. Arrow demands 
relaxation of one of the five assumptions in the judiciary so that appellate 
courts can function without a “dictator.” This Article concludes that the 
Independence assumption must be relaxed in the judiciary, as well as in 
the legislative branch.99 
                                                                                                             
 98 Bruce Chapman, Between Markets and Politics: A Social Choice Theoretic 
Appreciation of the Charitable Sector, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 821, 866 (1998). 
 99 The “division fallacy” is to assume a unitary judiciary. Adrian Vermeule, The 
Judiciary is a They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005). Vermeule claims the division fallacy muddles much 
theorizing about legal interpretation. Problems arise because commentators overlook the 
collective nature of a judicial body. That a given approach is good for the whole court 
does not mean it is good for that judge alone. Vermeule claims the best approach for any 
individual judge will vary depending on whether other judges adopt the same approach. 
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This will mean, paradoxically, that the power the judiciary uses to 
determine legislative intent undermines the Rule of Law because the 
Rule’s capability as a restrictive mechanism founders. Objectivity and 
the law’s capability to be “applied” as a tool are both weakened. That is, 
the Rule of Law legitimately restricts similar cases to be treated alike, 
ensuring that all are equal before the law regardless of whatever 
subjective preferences the judges may hold. This presumption works if 
the objective Rule of Law is “applied” rather than created by objective 
power. However, its purpose is undermined unless Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives is relaxed in multimember courts. The next 
section of this Article examines the jurisprudential consequences of 
relaxing Independence. 
A. Non-dictatorship and Pareto 
As they are within the legislature, Pareto and Non-dictatorship 
should be dismissed as the “relax-able” criteria. Were all judges on a 
court to prefer y as the best answer, the outcome z is not acceptable from 
that court (a non-Pareto answer). This must occur, at arbitrary times, if 
Pareto were relaxed. Nor are one single judge’s preferences followed in 
every single case, as would happen with an Arrovian dictator.100 Again, a 
dictator exists where, ex ante, any and all possible future decisions 
comport with the dictator’s preferences, no matter what the content of the 
other votes. All 216 possible rankings of three choices among three 
individual judges would have to match with one judge’s desires. 
Majority rule does not apply in such a scenario. What is the purpose of 
having multimember courts in such a scenario? Who should serve as the 
lone Justice? It is impossible to find this Herculean individual. There is 
no purpose in discussing the merits of group decisions if majority rule 
does not apply. These options would occur in either scenario, and are 
thus rejected outright. 
                                                                                                             
For example, division fallacy is pervasive in arguments that would justify textualism by 
its disciplining effect on legislatures that praise canons of construction. Id. at 583. 
Easterbrook has noted that the “entire judiciary is modeled as a single judge on a single 
court. It isn’t.” Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the 
Lens of Public Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 288 (1992). Easterbrook agrees 
that courts with multiple members produce “cycling, path dependence, and other unhappy 
outcomes.” Id. 
100For evidence that there is no dictator, see any one of the Harvard Law Review’s annual 
Supreme Court issues. The section on “Term Statistics” shows majorities and dissents 
that contain all Justices, a situation which could never occur with an Arrovian dictator. 
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B. Stearns and Standing 
Maxwell Stearns has argued that appellate courts prevent Arrovian 
cycling and arbitrary outcomes by developing procedural doctrines like 
standing to reduce Range.101 According to this idea, limiting the number 
of binary comparisons relative to the number of available options 
removes the decision from the Arrovian framework. Stearns’ suggestion 
that this would help reduce Arrovian problems is correct. In Arrovian 
terms, Stearns’ argument for the standing doctrine is that limiting Range 
achieves the simple and fewest number of possible issues in a case, and 
thereby allows Pareto, Non-dictatorship, Independence, and Transitivity 
to “work” to efficiently lead to a “best” answer. 
Path dependence problems would be restricted by standing, but this 
assumes the law is applied objectively, and that standing is applied 
objectively. If this were the case, opportunistic ideological litigants could 
not manipulate path dependence through the three major subsets of (1) 
no right to enforce the rights of others, (2) no right to prevent diffuse 
harms, and (3) no right to an undistorted market.102 However, as Stearns 
recognizes, the development of the standing doctrine itself was made by 
judicial powers. Therefore, to say path dependence is restricted by the 
standing doctrine is to beg the question of how one would objectively 
apply the “science of interpretation.”103 
However, this Article suggests that there are never less than three 
jurisprudential issues before a court.104 Again, attempting to limit Range 
raises the question of what jurisprudential philosophy exists in the 
background for cases that do reach courts. During the start of a statutory 
interpretation case, for example, originalism, pragmatism, or 
Dworkinism will fail to provide a single, discrete and strict method as to 
how to limit Range. The same goes for the standing doctrine or Chevron 
deference, as an example of another means of reducing issues in front of 
                                                                                                             
 101 Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309 (1995) 
 102 Stearns, supra note 101, at 1309. 
 103 Stearns’ study of Range examines the New Deal Supreme Court, as well as the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts, to prove his thesis on the power of judicial control of 
standing. Id. at 1401. Consider that the determination of a constitutional or statutory 
“injury” is not clearly defined in the law. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 562–63 (1992) (observing that although the desire to observe an animal species for 
aesthetic purposes is “undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing,” there 
was no standing for the plaintiff to sue because the injury was not definitely predictable). 
 104 Outcome voting, rather than issue voting, ensures a decision even when no 
majority agrees on both the issue and the conclusion (outcome). See Tracey E. George & 
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Constitutional Law: How is Constitutional Law Made?, 100 MICH. 
L. REV. 1265, 1270 (2002) (reviewing MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: 
A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING (2000)). 
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federal courts. Consider that the “ideal” originalists on an appellate court 
might assert differences of opinion as to how to find the original intent 
while pragmatists are patently fraught with anarchical priorities due to a 
lack of a guiding star. Dworkin’s Herculean judge would search for the 
“best answer” with little to assure himself that another Herculean judge 
will reach the same “best” conclusion. Thus, it is never possible to 
completely limit Range to the necessary two issues in front of multi-
member appellate panels.105 This remains so whether asserting 
“standing,” Chevron deference, legal ethics or judicial codes, or any 
other doctrine attempting to limit issues or create responsibilities. 
The method used to decide how to limit Range is itself subject to 
the Arrovian proof. Range, therefore, is not the answer to what must be 
relaxed.106 There is no objective way to perform this “relaxation.” 
C. Easterbrook and Transitivity 
Easterbrook’s seminal article combining Arrow and Supreme Court 
jurisprudence attempted to determine which Arrovian assumption must 
be relaxed. Easterbrook concluded that the Court must keep the four 
characteristics of Range, Non-dictatorship, Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives, and Pareto, but could lose Transitivity.107 This is incorrect. 
First, this Article explains the consequences of relaxing Transitivity and 
the next section dissects the repercussions of relaxing Independence. 
To only relax Transitivity, appellate courts would make decisions 
like the following example. Assume Profile 7 of Figure 2 from Part II 
results in the arbitrary decision that the conflict between y and z will be 
ranked in favor of y (the same arbitrary decision made earlier). Now, 
assume both Marshall and Taney (Profile 9) unanimously rank z ahead of 
x. Transitivity should force outcome yzx from yz (an outcome derived 
from Independence) with zx (from Pareto). Relaxing Transitivity is a way 
to prevent A from being the dictator, but may lead to xyz.108 That is, if z is 
                                                                                                             
 105 Even with one-word responses on appeals subjective bargains would still exist in 
the background. For example, consider First Amendment obscenity appeals which were 
either “reversed” or “affirmed.”  One judge may have focused on the original intent of the 
Framers while another applied a “living constitution” interpretation. Such answers are not 
known and thus, limiting range serves little purpose. 
 106 For more on the complexities of the path-dependence issue, see Stearns, supra note 
101. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Hansen, supra note 17, at 222 (“In general . . . when a value judgment that 
corresponds to neither individual’s ranking is initially imposed (thereby immediately 
ruling out a dictatorship), it is impossible to socially order all thirty-six preference 
profiles because of an inevitable intransitivity.”); Feldman & Serrano, supra note 44, at 5 
(providing an Arrovian example where only transitivity is relaxed, while the remaining 
four assumptions hold). Note that Pareto is violated in this example as well. 
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preferred to x for every profile, and x preferred over y, how and when 
does a decision making mechanism determine when, precisely, zPxPy 
will not be the preferred outcome? Why do this for Profile 9 and not 
another profile? Making this choice for another profile would be just as 
legitimate as doing this in Profile 9 because it would be just as arbitrary. 
Such an outcome can never be predictable.109 
In Easterbrook’s analysis, relaxing transitivity led to inconsistent 
adjudication, and this was a negative but inexorable result. While a 
dictatorship is immediately precluded with this choice, jurisprudence 
theorists should find this is too costly a price—especially since there is 
an alternative without this cost.110 
Before arguing why relaxing Independence is the solution for 
appellate decisions, this Article discusses why not simply relaxing the 
“Completeness” element of Transitivity is ineffective. The problem with 
this argument is determining when the situation occurs, without any 
definable objective mechanism. Like any attempt to limit Range with the 
standing or Chevron doctrines,111 the intractable issue is how to 
determine which cases would qualify. The crux of this Article is the 
assertion that there is no objective algorithm, according to the Arrovian 
proof, for determining how and when judges would know to consider 
certain options. It is itself another Arrovian group problem. Therefore, 
relaxing the “Completeness” characteristic inherent in Transitivity is a 
result beyond the pale of possibility. 
                                                                                                             
 109 Mueller offered an oligarchy as the means to provide some stability in this 
situation. His solution was to empower a select few to make arbitrary decisions. 
However, determining how to pick these individuals is an intractable problem. In 
addition, it is difficult to enforce arbitrary powers. Again, society presumably desires to 
avoid constitutional protections against the arbitrary effects of lawmaking. That the “king 
[or oligarchy] can do no wrong” is not currently part of our accepted democratic ideals. 
 110 “[A]s Lon Fuller maintained, knowing what the law is and knowing how to 
comply are necessary conditions for legality itself.”  Larry Alexander & Frederick 
Schauer,  Defending Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 482 (2000) 
(citing LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (2d ed. Yale U. Press 1969)). “John 
Marshall’s claim is nothing less than the observation, later refined by Fuller, that without 
a single and authoritative interpreter there would be little difference between law and the 
numerous non-enforced directives we find in philosophy books and advice columns.” Id. 
See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 266 (Aspen Publishers 2003) 
(quoting HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., The Lawbook 
Exchange, LTD. 2002) (1967); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237–39 (Oxford 
University Press 1971)). 
 111 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Justice Stevens reasoned, “when a challenge to an agency construction . . . really centers 
on the wisdom of an agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within 
a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who 
have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those 
who do.” Id. 
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In sum, deciding in which cases Transitivity should not apply is 
itself a communal decision subject to Arrow’s proof. Therefore, any 
attempt in this vein is dismissed. Completeness is a necessary 
characteristic of the appellate court decisionmaking process. 
Consequently, Pareto, Non-dictatorship, Range, and Transitivity may not 
be relaxed in an appellate court decision-making mechanism. The Article 
now considers the Independence assumption. 
D. Relaxing Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: Bargaining is 
Positively Necessary, and Normatively Acceptable 
In review, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives characteristic 
has two elements. Independence imposes both (1) a restriction on 
changing outcomes due to a change in choice sets, and (2) an initial 
assumption that a group’s members bargain ordinally rather than 
cardinally.112 Relaxing Independence immediately refutes both 
characteristics—there is no part-ordinal, part-cardinal means of ranking 
choices. This provides the most palatable and practical answer to the 
judiciary’s Arrovian decision. In fact, Independence must be relaxed for 
appellate courts to function. 
1. Process of Elimination: Majority Rule Fails Unless Independence 
is Relaxed 
First, the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is the suspect 
axiom by process of elimination, as the preceding sections show. Range 
can never truly be limited to two jurisprudential methods in any single 
case. Relaxing the Non-dictatorship principle, Pareto, or Transitivity 
would lead to decisions society would not tolerate. One person cannot 
control an appellate court’s decisions, which would occur if Non-
dictatorship were relaxed. Any group decision must be subject to 
majority rule, which is destroyed if Pareto or Transitivity is relaxed. If 
the notion of majority rule losing to a minority’s votes (something that 
must occur at unpredictable and arbitrary times) is rejected, then one has 
to acknowledge that Independence is the axiom relaxed. 
2. Majority Rule Survives if Independence is Relaxed 
The “intuition” at the heart of Hanson’s graphical illustration of 
Arrow’s proof in Part II indicated that among two persons choosing 
between three options, only one single arbitrary decision (from Profile 7, 
for example) would “trickle-down” in all thirty-six preference profiles. 
The example led to a complete solution for the entire puzzle. After all of 
                                                                                                             
 112 See Tabarrok, supra note 52, at 8–9. 
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the boxes were filled in, the Article noted that one of the two individuals’ 
preferences coincidentally matched every outcome. This occurred due to 
the four assumptions of Pareto, Range, Transitivity, and most 
importantly, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. The result was that 
an Arrovian dictator existed, showing that the fifth assumption of Non-
dictatorship was violated. 
In an appellate court, even among a large number of options 
(originalism, textualism, Dworkinism, pragmatism, etc.), only one 
arbitrary decision would be needed to “trickle-down.” There are always 
more than three choices in a jurisprudential decision-making scenario. 
The vast power of the Independence assumption is crucial. An alternative 
means of understanding this proof derives from Feldman and Serrano’s 
analysis: since three judges could potentially choose three outcomes of a 
Condorcet Paradox, and Completeness demands an outcome, one of the 
judges must “win” even though no majority would choose that judge’s 
preferences. The result from either point of view is the same—to prevent 
the Arrovian dictator, one must relax an assumption. That assumption 
must be the Independence assumption. 
To relax Independence, the possibility of an “ordinal” ranking of 
preferences is lost, and cardinal preferences are used instead. The 
practical effect of this solution is that judges signal and exert intensities 
of their preferences, finalizing their demands through cardinal bargains. 
Appellate bodies resolve their differences among jurisprudential theories 
in this way. Whether the approach is originalist, Dworkinian, or 
pragmatist, the issues for resolution are the same. Coherent decisions are 
allowed after bargains among positions coalesce into a majority, and 
majority rule triumphs. 
Again, cardinal bargaining means that individuals make the group 
decision by opining and contracting on the importance of their opinions. 
It is the relationship between an individual judge’s impression of the 
importance of his own opinion and the convictions of other judges that 
controls the outcome. Since no objective means exists to “normalize”113 
the different impressions, each judge says what the law is because the 
judge says so. This syllogism at the heart of the interaction among 
appellate judges is to use power. Even if the law-reader/judge attempts to 
objectively ascertain the “Rule of Law,” it is the resultant interaction 
between the judges, comprised of subjective determinations, that leads to 
a final adjudication. 
                                                                                                             
 113 To normalize here would be to conform individual preferences to a certain 
standard so that they may be weighed against each other. No method exists to ascertain 
each individual’s benefits in an objective manner. 
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These subjective determinations are anathema to the liberal project, 
under which judges purportedly ascertain and apply the rule of law to 
objectively control each case. Rather, multimember courts create the law 
through personal predilections. They do not “apply” the law as if it could 
be objectively ascertained. Individual determinations invade each 
adjudication. All adjudication truly results from this “active” judicial 
role. 
Stearns’s Range problems are satisfied. Among more than three 
issues, a compromise is reached on one outcome, albeit at times by the 
narrow margins of one vote. Easterbrook should be satisfied with this 
solution, as well. Easterbrook has stated that arbitrary precedents arise 
due to path dependence, creating a general incoherence in the law.114 
This would, indeed, be the consequence if Transitivity were relaxed. 
However, instead of the arbitrariness problem Easterbrook poses due to 
relaxing Transitivity, majorities—even narrow ones—are created by 
relaxing Independence instead. Neither textualism nor intentionalism 
(nor “formalism”) provides an answer as successful as this. Rather, as 
mentioned above, even members agreeing on the same jurisprudential 
theory may still disagree when voting, which means only appointment or 
arbitrary election of a “dictator” would suffice for intentionalist or 
textualist theories. 
How would the ideal originalist, for example, find legislative 
intent? Should he use legislative history? Or use committee comments 
only, since the committee was the “expert”? What about conversations 
between the swing-vote Senator and the Senator’s husband?115 
Compromise is the critical role for the judge in the Rule of Law. 
Easterbrook posited that the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives criterion means the determination of a case about the Eighth 
Amendment should not be influenced by a judge’s beliefs about the 
negligence system, or “that plaintiffs with red hair (or black skin) ought 
to lose.”116 This Article maintains that Independence is extremely 
restrictive when one arbitrary decision “trickles down” in the Arrovian 
proof. This will mean it is impossible to objectively apply a rule that 
decides whether an issue is “red-haired” versus “relevant.” 
Easterbrook stated, “In any judicial system, irrelevant alternatives 
must be disregarded. Logrolling, one way of handling intensity of 
preferences about ‘extraneous’ matters in legislative systems, is excluded 
                                                                                                             
 114 See supra notes 20, 85, 86.  
 115 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire, 100 HARV L. REV. 1166 (1987). 
 116 Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 825–
26 (1982). 
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. . . .”117 Here, Easterbrook makes an incorrect inference about 
Independence. It is wrong to dismiss an “irrelevant” alternative this way. 
Rather, logrolling, of a sort, is not excluded from appellate adjudication 
by simply dismissing the “unreasonable” alternatives. 
To illustrate the problem with this consideration of “irrelevance,” 
consider the prior examples involving the 1992 and 2000 U.S. 
presidential elections and cycles among chocolate, vanilla, and 
strawberry. While red hair or beliefs about negligence seem to have little 
to do with an Eighth Amendment case, what about originalism, 
textualism, and pragmatism (to say nothing of a coherent theory of stare 
decisis, or the differences among originalists, textualists and 
Dworkinists)? This is the critical point: there is no clear way to disregard 
myriad alternatives as “irrelevant.” 
No issue or alternative is irrelevant just because it will not be the 
victor in a case. Neither Ross Perot nor Ralph Nader nor strawberry is 
irrelevant, but these would be dismissed under the “red hair” analogy. 
Irrelevance does not mean a “losing conviction” or “losing premise.” 
Irrelevance is not an empowerment to dismiss a myriad of persuasive 
factual points in a case, “pure” textual interpretations of a statute or 
constitution, or versions of “neutral principles.” Further, the attempt to 
carve the relevant out of a “reasonableness” principle does not prevent a 
lack of steadfast and objective boundaries to the interpretation. The result 
is that a judge must weigh, and ultimately prefer, in varying degrees, 
different options based on the subjective. 
One “irrelevant” originalist position in a simplified example  
invoves a panel is dealing with a case where only one judge or justice 
takes an originalist position. Assume the remaining eight are evenly split 
(4-4) between one single, unified, and homogeneous textualist 
interpretation of the case, and one single, unified, and homogeneous 
pragmatic position. Easterbrook’s explanation of the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives assumption is impermissible because there is no 
clear stopping point between the judge’s originalist convictions and the 
importance of a litigant’s red hair.  
If the judge’s intensity of conviction leads him to believe one 
position or the other is the better outcome for his jurisprudence, then his 
originalist belief results in the deciding vote. It is not necessary that his 
pragmatic theories influence the case, but they may be a factor. The same  
factors influence the judge’s “intentionalist” views. The outcome perhaps 
unites four judges, who, instead of writing a watershed pragmatic 
                                                                                                             
 117 Id. 
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opinion, write a compromise that takes account of the intersection of 
originalism and pragmatic theory. 
This demonstrates that the bargain struck was between intensities of 
preferences, resulting in a final interpretation between different ideals. 
The bargain was not a vote among deep, homogeneous, and clear 
interpretations from different but discrete single schools of 
jurisprudence. 
There is no objective standard available to discern when a 
jurisprudential theory or factor becomes classified as “red-haired.”118 
Rather, the litigants themselves receive different interpretations based on 
varying presumptions in different situations.119 In the ice cream 
adjudication example, the judges use differing amounts of chocolate, 
vanilla, and strawberry in the interpretation. In reality, there would be 
numerous interpretations of each flavor, thus more thoroughly blending 
the jurisprudential compromise. 
Only where Independence is relaxed do judges consider these 
issues in a subjective manner, effectively contracting among their 
                                                                                                             
 118 The “vehicles in the park” problem lies here—it is an intractable problem without 
an answer, as shown by the Arrovian analysis. It is a useful pedagogical hypothetical 
because it can never be solved. For a real-life version of the “vehicles in the park” 
problem, consider a law prohibiting buildings “other than one detached single-family 
dwelling.” Does this bar a children’s playhouse? See Traylor v. Holloway, 142 S.E.2d 
521, 523 (Va. 1965) (yes). A concrete doghouse? See Univ. Gardens Prop. Owners 
Assoc. v. Solomon, 88 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (yes). A wire-mesh cage on a 
concrete floor designed as a pen for two pet cougars?  See Turidic v. Stephens, 31 P.3d 
465 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (no, because this was a permissible “residential use”). A parking 
lot and menu board for a drive-in Burger King restaurant?  See 5011 Cmty. Org. v. 
Harris, 548 A.2d 9 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (no, these are not “buildings”). The Idaho 
Supreme Court suggested the principle of free use of land should guide judges when 
judges find ambiguity. Pinehaven Planning Bd v. Brooks, 70 P.3d 664, 667 (Idaho 2003). 
See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 553 (3d ed. 2005). 
The original “vehicles in the park” problem is taken from H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 125–26 (1961). For a report on a judge’s role in deciding whether the social utility 
should affect the outcome of the case, see BARRY WERTH, DAMAGES 48 (Berkeley Books 
1999) (reporting that after the judge took an injured baby in his arms at a pretrial 
conference, the judge stated “This woman needs some money”). 
 119 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS, 292–93 
(3d ed. 2005) (citing Consol. Edison Co. v. Hoffman, 374 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1978)) 
(providing a public entity with a more favorable version of the state’s “unnecessary 
hardship” zoning test than other uses); and Sica v. Bd. of Adjustment, 603 A.2d 30 (N.J. 
1992) (providing a for-profit senior citizen care facility with more favorable treatment in 
the state’s “inherently beneficial” zoning constraint test than for other uses). See also 
Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (striking down racial covenants as violative of public 
policy). 
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preferences.120 Consequently, judges may, and indeed do, consider 
litigants’ characteristics free from any objective restrictions. 
Another consequence of not relaxing Independence is that if judges 
are prevented from cardinal bargaining, there is no guarantee that a panel 
avoid a Condorcet cycling problem. In Arrovian terms, Range is always 
much larger than the simple three-choice example in Part II.121 Assume, 
however, that there are only three choices. If the three judges prefer the 
following choices, the ordinal preferences lead to no winner, and no 
loser.122 
 
Judge Rank: 1st 2nd 3rd 
Ben  c v s 
Jerry  v s c 




How could judges decide cases without intensity-preferences?123 In 
a Condorcet cycling situation there would be no panel adjudication. 
Further, without cardinality, as seen in the example of agenda control, a 
panel using ordinal rankings will eventually result in an arbitrary 
outcome that no majority would choose.124 These examples should 
                                                                                                             
 120 To see the compromise most clearly, note that judicial opinions are not typically 
answered with a simple “affirmed” or “reversed” conclusion, but with a rationale. This 
rationale is a compromise and cannot be predicted. 
 121 But see Stearns, supra note 101, at 1065 (arguing that the  number of “genuine” 
legal issues in a case, which are part of the necessary disposition of a case, are “fairly 
stable and small”). 
 122 See Figure 5. 
 123 This Article notes that it is “erroneous[] [to presume] that the ‘median Justice’ 
wields the bulk of the Court’s power. Even if there were a median Justice, it is far from 
clear whether he would be the Most Dangerous Justice.” Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, 
“Duel” Diligence: Second Thoughts about the Supremes as the Sultans of Swing, 70 S. 
CAL. L REV. 219 (1996). Edelman and Chen offer a mathematical indexing of Justices 
and apply the index and a median voter theorem to conclude that Justice O’Connor did 
not wield more than a proportional one-ninth share of decision-making—in fact it was 
Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg in two respective Court terms. The article concludes that 
power does not derive from being the median voter. Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The 
Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 63 (1996). 
 124 For articles on the conflict between strategic vote-switching and stare decisis in 
action, see, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, A Matter of Judgment, Not a Matter of Opinion, 74 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 123 (1999) (arguing against complete deference to the judicial branch’s 
opinion on Constitutional interpretation because courts decide cases rather than 
pronounce the law, and may get it wrong due to their multimember make-up); Michael J. 
Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991) (considering the tension from stare decisis, alleged 
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illustrate that judges must individually bargain about how this principle 
is “[some degree]” more important than that principle. 
Arrow’s Proof thus shows that jurisprudential methods purporting 
to restrict judges are inadequate. The “Independence” assumption cannot 
be allowed to exert its force in a group decision. If it did, the use of 
majority rule in courts fails. 
3. Majority Rule: An Illegitimate Strategy? 
Easterbrook and others assert that strategy in appellate court 
adjudication is illegitimate.125 This Article takes an opposing position. 
                                                                                                             
stability, and the problems for judges and theorists who attempt adhere to some unifying 
principle); Edward A. Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United States, 44 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 643 (2002) (arguing the traditional practice of tie votes affirming the court 
below is correct because mischief could ensue in the creation of an opinion resolved by a 
plurality). Hartnett cites Stearns’ suggestion that the deliberations for Bush v. Gore, 531 
U.S. 1060 (2000) may have faced a judgment impasse if a plurality would have carried 
the day, as four Justices favored remand. Id. at 670. Stearns and Abramowicz speculated 
that Justices Souter and Breyer failed to convince either Justices Kennedy or O’Connor to 
switch to a meaningful remand, thus collapsing the possibility of affirmance and forming 
a majority outcome where the three favoring reversal switched to an empty remand. 
Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political 
Economy of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1947–50 (2001). These authors 
suggested “[the] Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas accepted Bush’s equal 
protection argument and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy did not reach Bush’s Article II 
argument in order to avoid revealing the paradox of Bush winning the judgment even 
though he lost each issue.”  Hartnett, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. at n.96. As an example of 
a desire to change the law through personal conviction, or perhaps alternatively, as an 
example of a changed determination of what the Rule of Law requires, see Callins v. 
Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1154–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding the death 
penalty unconstitutional and vowing to join Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., in dissent to 
every capital case thereafter). 
 125 Despite all earnestness with which Supreme Court Justices and their clerks 
perform their duties, one fatal flaw dooms the Court’s decisionmaking process to 
permanent incoherence and indeterminacy. Like any legislature, the Court makes 
collective decisions. Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theory, launched to expose the folly 
in attributing consistency and rationality to legislative voting, has surprisingly left the 
judiciary almost unscathed. The academy almost adheres to a fantasy of an almighty, 
perfectly rational Court that operates in some nonexistent legal nirvana—“almost” . . . 
because Judge Easterbrook authoritatively demonstrated how the Court’s collective 
decisions will stay inconsistent. Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the Judicial 
Power, 59 MO. L. REV. 281, 297–98 (1994) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of 
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 814–23 (1982)). Chen incorrectly concludes 
that “the application of public choice theory to judicial decisionmaking suggests that the 
most important factors in any Supreme Court case may never explicitly appear [in the 
U.S. Reports]. . . . [A]ny imaginable rule can emerge from the Court [with the right 
catalyst, human or not human].” Id. at 299. “Arrow’s theory confirms this descent into 
chaos—this swan dive propelled by the ‘material self-interest of the judges’—is 
inexorable and irreversible.” Id. at 298. This Article suggests that Chen and Easterbrook 
carry Arrow’s proof too far. First, Farber’s 2D map metaphor offers some insight into the 
misunderstanding. The position that Arrovian criteria renders any attempt at cohesiveness 
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Easterbrook concluded Arrow leaves one option: relax Transitivity, and 
accept its inevitably arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes. A better answer 
is to relax Independence, and acknowledge that judges may assert 
intensity preferences. Relaxing Independence in favor of subjective 
cardinal bargaining (and majority rule) guarantees a statutory 
interpretation result in an adjudicated case. While the idea that judges 
objectively “apply” the Rule of Law is lost, the potential to make a single 
coherent decision in every case is gained. Further, the bargaining does 
not invoke concerns with the jurisprudential process. 
Judges need not rank preferences in an ordinal sequence. Rather, 
intensities can and should be used. When an appellate court makes a 
decision, the foresight of the judges is crucial. The judicial query “How 
will this decision affect the next case?” anticipates future cases as if a 
judge were making a contract with a future court’s interpretation of a 
present adjudication.126 While this is magnified most obviously by 
Supreme Court holdings, the analysis applies at all state and federal 
appellate bodies. Judges make subjective decisions when selecting 
between approaches for legal interpretations.  
Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager note that strategic behavior 
for judging seems implicitly pejorative, but assert that in truth, it is the 
norm for judges to sacrifice details of their subjective beliefs in the 
service of producing an outcome and opinion attributable to the court.127 
Simply, sometimes judges will switch votes because of their priorities 
among different methods of jurisprudential decision-making. However, 
this Article argues that bargaining is necessary in every single case. 
This Article does not contend that filibusters or log-rolling must 
occur as patently as within a legislature.128 The tradeoff, “I’ll vote for 
your views on Smith v. Jones if you vote for me in Marbury v. Madison,” 
is not required to relax Independence. Nor does bargaining require a 
                                                                                                             
useless is not persuasive because Independence may be relaxed. Further, Hansen’s 
explanation shows there is little to be said by Arrow. It is simply a puzzle proving one 
fact, but when the rules are relaxed the anathema result is removed as well. 
 126 “The existence of cycles influences the way judges write their opinions. . . . [I]t is 
important for each group of judges to write separately in order to preserve its options for 
the next round of cases.”  Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and 
Limitation of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 840–41 (1990) (citing 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982)). 
 127 Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication 
in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL L. REV. 1, 52–53 (1993). 
 128 Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 
97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999) (considering whether a judge may appropriately engage in 
strategic behavior). Caminker argues that strategic vote trading may further legitimate 
judicial objectives, but is not clearly so beneficial as to withstand against objections 
suggesting that it is improper judicial behavior. Id. at 2380 (concluding that there is no 
clear answer yet). 
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financial benefit traded for votes. Instead, Independence is sufficiently 
relaxed by the simple replacement of ordinal preferences with cardinal 
preferences. 
Cardinal bargaining is essentially represented as, “How strongly, on 
whatever subjective scale you choose, do you, your Honor, care about 
how to conclude the Smith case?” Johnathan Nash cites the strategy in 
multimember courts to offer an example of what Nash calls the “stopping 
rule.”129 This phenomenon exists where a court explaining a new rule of 
law deliberately refuses to identify distinct elements of a test, and instead 
provides for a “balancing test.” One view of such action is that the court 
allows tensions in the choice of voting protocols to percolate. 
Alternatively, the court may decide between a desire to adjudicate with 
“issue voting” or with “outcome voting.” Either way, the judges 
comprising the majority strike a judicial bargain.130 
Consider a 2-1 opinion in an appellate court that distinguishes 
relevant precedent “on the facts.” Alternatively, consider a 2-1 opinion 
including a balancing test. Such a bargain, although merely a balancing 
test and not a conclusive and clear “per se” rule, might seem to provide 
more predictability than an outcome where a three-member court writes a 
“per curiam” opinion, a concurrence, and a dissent.131 Predictability in 
the law does not exist because judges apply an objective Rule of Law. In 
every subsequent case, the appellate court bargains over the precedent set 
below, re-interpreting the case, statute, or constitutional issues that 
surface within the suit. Bargaining occurs whether the precedent is a 2-1 
adjudication or an en banc 11-0 decision. The interpretation is subjective. 
The fear is that perhaps judges could take strategies too far. 
Kornhauser and Sager suggest that a judge may “cross the line” if a 
judge “disingenuously joins an opinion dismissing a case on justiciability 
. . . to avoid an outcome on the merits she regards as unjust.”132 The 
                                                                                                             
 129 Johnathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for 
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 158–59 (2003) (recommending en banc 
reviews to limit the doctrinal paradox). 
 130 Id. 
 131 For another example of judicial bargaining over the direction of antitrust law, see 
William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Decision Making and the Supreme Court: Perspectives 
from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 93, 97–99 (1997). For an 
example of a judge who arguably changed his mind about an originalist position, see 
Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that marijuana 
“grown at home and possessed for personal use [is commerce among the states, partly 
because it is] never more than an instant from the interstate market . . . .”). 
 132 William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Decision Making and the Supreme Court: 
Perspectives from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 93, 97–99 
(1997). As an example of bargaining at or near the line, Evan Caminker cites Justice 
Brennan’s position in Craig v. Boren, finding that statutory or administrative sex 
classifications were subject to intermediate scrutiny, as a strategic vote to establish a 
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concern is understandable from the law-reader as the law-giver, but there 
is no objective mechanism in interpretation prohibiting such conduct. 
4. The Goal is a Decision 
Individual preferences between judges are necessary for appellate 
court adjudication, so legislative intent alone cannot be the only source 
fueling interpretations. Rather, as critical legal scholars posit, the Rule of 
Law depends on the personal and jurisprudential philosophies the judges 
bring to deliberations.133 
This does not undermine the law if courts are properly considered. 
Though the liberal project must fail, it is not a tragedy since 
jurisprudential compromises should not be considered awkward or 
suspicious. 
If judges on a court must bargain to avoid Arrovian problems, they 
use subjective guidance to provide transitivity and coherence to 
adjudication. But if the alternative is that preferences from a minority of 
judges control over a majority, the alternative is no longer feasible. Yet 
this would occur if Pareto were relaxed. Even less promising, if Non-
dictatorship were relaxed, only one vote would be necessary to defeat all 
other votes. However, even this scenario does not comprise the ultimate 
decision-making failure. The worst option is to relax Transitivity, where 
at times all persons could vote the same way but could produce an 
outcome in which the victor is not based on any votes cast. Such 
incoherence in adjudication is resolved when Independence is relaxed. 
Each judge identifies the principles of meaning for a statute, judicial 
                                                                                                             
“durable precedent for intermediate scrutiny rather than voting sincerely for strict 
scrutiny.” Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember 
Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, 2380 (1999) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976)). Compromises between personal, watershed desires and actual outcomes abound 
in Constitutional Law. For example, Justice Black’s stance on freedom of speech; Justice 
Brennan on equal protection; see also Justice Scalia’s approach to the Commerce Clause 
using originalism in Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 133 See Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984); Paul 
Martin et al., Of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1–26 (1985) 
(debating the usefulness of critical legal studies, nihilism, and the Rule of Law). See also 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353, 381 
(1989) (noting Judge Calabresi’s suggestion that courts should constantly examine 
current legal developments, but also current social, economic, moral, and political 
values). For an additional example, Maxwell Chibundu suggests that legal ideas can be 
derived from “without law” and are “legal” by virtue of translation into practice of law. 
His “applied structuralism” approach considers background context, similar to Dworkin’s 
method, and applies this as a limitation to interpretation. Maxwell O. Chibundu, Structure 
and Structuralism in the Interpretation of Statutes, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1439, 1443, 1492–
94 (1994). However, such subjective considerations do not show how one would or 
should interpret a statute, constitution, or prior case law. 
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opinion, or basic values through personal predilections. This adjudicative 
use is based on personal power, but is necessary.134 
How may a judge wield this power in light of the “degradation 
ceremony” and what Tushnet calls society’s “deep assumptions prevalent 
in our culture?” The question is whether strategy is inappropriate. 
Michael Wells has suggested that “[i]ntegrity in adjudication is not 
necessarily abandoned with strategic bargaining.”135 Initially, this may 
not seem to lead to predictable processes. However, communal 
adjudication cannot be expected to be 100% predictable since it depends 
on subjective human desires. This becomes apparent upon acceptance 
that the law changes when the members of the judiciary shift. 
Empirical studies confirm that appellate courts do make policy 
judgments based on political inclinations.136 As anecdotal evidence of 
this, one Justice famously asked his law clerks “What [is] the most 
important thing to know about the Supreme Court?” The Justice “would 
pause, then hold up his five fingers and explain that five votes enable a 
Justice to do anything.”137 This transforms the judge/law-reader into the 
                                                                                                             
 134 See William N. Eskridge, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 765 GEO. L.J. 1361, 
1425 (1988) (citing stare decisis as a dynamic issue which the Court continues to grapple 
with, and suggesting it is sometimes beneficial to be “dynamic,” even if that results in the 
need to contradict express statutory language). 
 135 Wells, M., Busting the Hart & Weschler Paradigm, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 557, 
579 (1995) (discussing integrity, Dworkinism, and the coherence of the courts). 
 136 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. 
Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV 1717 (1997) (finding empirical evidence that judges’ personal 
policy judgments do intrude into the Rule of Law in the D.C. Circuit); Tracey E. George, 
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. 
L. J. 1635 (1998) (demonstrating through mathematical modeling that circuit judges 
behave according to “attitudinal” models and “strategic” models); Sanford Levinson, Law 
as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 391 (1982) (cautioning that there is no Rule of Law, 
only power, then likening judicial decision-making to the interpretation of literature to 
conclude that there may be no limits to judicial proclivities). 
 137 Panel Discussion: Remembering a Constitutional Hero, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
13, 21 (1999); Jim Chen, Correspondence: A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional 
Acquiescence and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764, 1799 (2004). 
See also James F. Simon, Dialogue: Speech: Politics and the Rehnquist Court, 40 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REV. 863, 875 (1996) (discussing that, alternatively, this may have been an 
explanation for how the Supreme Court makes erroneous decisions, as this may more 
often have occurred “[e]arly in a term, usually after one of Justice Brennan’s new law 
clerks had raged over a hopelessly wrongheaded majority opinion by one of Justice 
Brennan’s more conservative colleagues. . . .”); Transcript: Looking Back on Penn 
Central: A Panel Discussion with the Supreme Court Litigators, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. 
LAW REV., 287, 307 (2004) (recounting how in a conversation about the Penn Central 
takings case, a former law clerk explained his role and his perception of the Justice’s role: 
“[F]rom a law clerk’s perspective, the main importance of oral argument was that it was 
an opportunity to get a sense of what the other Justices thought. [The former clerk then 
explained legal disputes he would eventually write about in the opinion]” and discussing 
the writing of the actual opinion: “But I was trying very hard really to hold the Court, that 
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law-giver if he or she is shifting the law one way or another based on 
bargains.138 
In response to nihilist inferences that may mistakenly surface in this 
Article, there is nothing fundamentally flawed or “wrong” with the 
conclusion that law may not be “applied.” Rather, properly internalized 
and expected by the public, politicians, and judges, this analysis shows 
what the appellate judiciary is useful for, and what it is not. An appellate 
court may provide a “reasonable” interpretation of any text, may assert a 
compromise indicating a reasonable analysis of what “legislative intent” 
was found, and what that intent is, or even make an “unreasonable” 
decision about a new course of the law.139 Under the Arrovian decision-
making mechanism, the “unreasonable,” jurisprudentially speaking, is 
just as legitimate an adjudication as a “reasonable” decision. Majority 
rule is followed. No guidance may be found before a case is decided by 
any objective “science of interpretation,” and this should be 
acknowledged. 
Concededly, judges do make decisions based on power rather with 
an objective metric. Even the contracts that may exist between judges 
and future adjudicators cannot prohibit, on any clear jurisprudential 
principle, an unintended re-interpretation. If the judiciary receives 
                                                                                                             
was the number one objective when you were working on an opinion for [the Justice], to 
produce an opinion that at least five Justices would join that would hold the Court.”). 
 138 For a critique against using Arrow in the manner applied in this Article, Richard 
Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson argue against applying Arrow to the law. These authors 
posit that Arrow, and social choice theory in general, are simply “irrelevant” to 
democratic values because “the values people care about . . . are plural and often 
incommensurable [and therefore] cannot be expressed adequately through consistent 
preference rankings over outcomes described in the sparse terms available to social 
choice theory.” Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at 
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2142 (1990). Pildes and Anderson suggest that public choice is 
specifically useless regarding incommensurable values of “forming a more perfect 
Union,” and “securing blessings of liberty” as ideals incapable of being restricted to 
consequentialist preference rankings. Id. at 2146. This Article disagrees with their 
implicit assumptions. Arrow does not attempt to restrict the search for a “more perfect 
Union” or “liberty,” nor free speech or equal protection. Rather, Arrow presented a 
cooperation problem. When a statute is presented, voted upon, and passed, it may have 
specific aspects such as time limits, quotas, or concepts that must be interpreted. There 
are indeed democratic principles at work, but without some boundaries, cases could not 
be decided. Their assertions are too amorphous to apply as a constructive critique of 
social choice and thus this Article suggests their argument should be dismissed. 
 139 See generally N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (finding that the 
“actual malice” standard protects libel defendants), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 
(finding most laws against abortion violate constitutional privacy protections), Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (finding that a constitution 
does not embody a particular economic theory); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 
(delineating constitutional protections for criminal defendants). 
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support because society assumes the law is applied objectively, and this 
is the source of legitimate adjudications, injunctions, and judgments, 
society places its expectations on an empty concept. If it is “wrong” to 
allow judges to bargain, it should be regarded as equally wrong, if not 
irrational, to expect the mathematically impossible. 
This Article argues that society must acknowledge how judges 
bargain to escape the Arrovian proof. It is the severity of the proof put 
forth in this Article that provides legitimacy for the use of cardinal 
preferences. 
V. SUBJECTIVE USE OF A POWERFUL POSITION FORMS THE                   
“RULE OF LAW” 
A. Review 
This Article concludes that the law-reader is the law-giver in 
appellate courts. Though the claim is not new, the proof offered is novel. 
Colin Diver, Sanford Levinson, and many others have stated that 
statutory interpretation, like literary interpretation, is “unavoidably an act 
of creating meaning. The very choice of principles by which the search 
for meaning is to be guided stamps the interpreter’s personality indelibly 
on the outcome of the inquiry.”140 This Article is distinguishable from 
Diver, Levinson, and others not because it disagrees with this notion, but 
because it shows the severe mathematical need for these personal choices 
by appellate judges. Unlike Levinson, the argument does not makes its 
assertion based on experience; rather, it derives its strength from an 
important and strict mathematical proof. The discretion of appellate 
judges allows coherence to exist in judgments; without it, important 
ethical norms fail and judicial dictators or mathematically arbitrary 
outcomes would exist. 
The consequence is that the appellate courts’ voting mechanism for 
adjudication is not restrictive. As Henry Hart stated, judges serve to 
reasonably interpret legislators, who in turn are “reasonable persons 
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably.”141 This is not more restrictive 
or helpful than using the guidance of “political morality.”142 Appellate 
adjudication is a continuing argument that morphs based on the powers 
and political morality wielded by judges. This opens the debate to the 
                                                                                                             
 140 Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 582–83 (1985). See also Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
373, 391 (1982). 
 141 HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1415 (10th ed. 1958). 
 142 Scalia, supra note 9. 
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“science of interpretation,” and some may find this problematic. What 
principles pose to a judge, a “cost” or “benefit” within the realm of his 
personal jurisprudential viewpoint to influence the outcome of the instant 
case? How does a specific group of judges view a cost-benefit analysis 
range in any specific case? Judges must bargain over which principles to 
employ on a case by case basis, wielding subjective preferences to 
analyze text, intent, or a “living constitution” concept, all framed by 
restrictions from precedent. The imposition of “precedent” is itself 
analyzed through subjective preferences, and is always susceptible to the 
bargains that accompany upcoming cases on the docket. 
B. Contracts and Stare Decisis: This Court and the Next 
The proclivities of appellate judges are paramount in adjudication 
since objective correctness can never be achieved.143 The fear, however, 
                                                                                                             
 143 Notably, even the controversial area of judicial lawmaking has support from the 
American people and Congress. See RALPH E. SHAFFER, THE BORK HEARINGS: 
HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION BATTLE IN U.S. 
HISTORY 29 (Markus Wiener Publications 2005). For example, Senator Specter, during 
the Bork Hearings, stated: 
I do not disagree with your interpretation of antitrust law, and I do not intend to 
pursue it any further. The limited point that I seek to make here on antitrust 
laws is the difficulty of finding congressional intent and the wide range of 
judicial discretion which necessarily applies. The practical effect of a judge’s 
role is to apply that discretion and not to be able to really find what legislators’ 
[sic] intend, and to try and make some sense out of what a judge may conclude 
to be a pernicious law, and to try to make some sense out of conflicting 
statements in the Congressional Record. A judge’s role is to really try to pull 
the whole picture together, and that is the tradition of the law, and I think 
appropriately so. . . . But I do think as you apply that beyond the antitrust field, 
into other legislative lines and into constitutional lines, there is a broader, 
traditional role of the judge in applying values to the needs of the nation 
beyond what you can find in some specific intent. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
However, Judge Bork stated: 
If I were a legislator, I would clearly vote for the smoke pollution ordinance 
and I would vote against the anti-contraceptive ordinance, and as a citizen I 
would oppose the anti-contraceptive statute and I would vote for the smoke 
pollution statutes. … The judge may not have a hierarchy of values that does 
not come from the Constitution. He may not say to a consumer: ‘You value 
your low-cost electricity, but that’s an ignoble value, whereas the other is a 
noble value’ unless the Constitution tells him to make that choice. . . . That is 
the only reason I say the judge has no way to tell those two cases apart if the 
Constitution does not speak. 
Id. at 93. 
Bork concluded that the difference between elected representatives and unelected judges 
is something society fails to respect. Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and 
Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 19 (2003). See also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (invalidating legislation seeking to benefit the poor, 
workers, or other social groups by interfering with individuals’ freedom to contract and 
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involves any single judge emphasizing principle x as important even 
though it may not be important for all.144 One may demand Tushnet’s 
“socialization” because of suspicion toward the arbitrary, to foster 
predictability. Richard Epstein comments, “[w]here there is some 
awkward compromise and accommodation, there is little to keep the 
purist in us happy” and, “[l]ike Caesar’s wife and baseball umpires, a 
judge must be above suspicion” [of bias, whence the danger of 
socializing with lawyers or of judging cases where the judge has 
financial interest, etc.]”145 
However, even more essential than predictability is the 
foundational requirement of simple coherence. This Article demonstrates 
that the solution to Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is to relax an 
assumption to create coherence in adjudication. To suggest any other 
restriction that cannot be as restrictive as the Independence assumption is 
to ask a judicial body to interpret a law, regulation, or perhaps an “ethical 
code” purporting to guide it. Judges cannot stay objective because this 
mechanism of restricting themselves is also subject to Arrow’s Proof. 
The appellate body cannot objectively apply the background control. In 
sum, alternatives cannot restrict the decision-making process once 
Independence is relaxed.  
The last potential restriction available to perhaps save the liberal 
project is the notion that judges contract to interpret. After dismissing the 
possible use of this restriction in the following section, the Article 
examines stare decisis. 
1. Are Contracts the Answer? No. 
Suppose judges attempt to interpret not through objectivity, but by 
actually attempting to contract with one another? Perhaps this approach 
                                                                                                             
individual property rights). See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994)  
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (finding the death penalty unconstitutional and vowing to join 
Brennan, J., and Marshall, J., in dissent to every capital case thereafter). 
 144 This is a critique of substantive due process. See e.g., Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down minimum wage laws for women and 
children); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (finding 
“a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of 
paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or of laissez faire”); 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (finding no 
Constitutional power to protect “liberty of the person both in its special and more 
transcendent dimensions.”). This social utility problem is illustrated by the problems of 
determining which groups should be protected as minorities and how to discern the 
guiding principle for that query. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that the anti-majoritarian guide is the principle for protecting 
“discrete and insular minorities”). 
 145 Richard A. Epstein, The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitation of 
Public Choice Theory, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 834, 855 (1990). 
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might suffice for society’s views of appellate legitimacy. Judges would 
enter contracts with future judges via single adjudications, in order to 
interpret the law. In this vein, judges would consider past bilateral as part 
of their subjective preferences. 146 
Yet each case will still demand compromises among a wide field of 
equally legitimate possibilities under textualism. It will also create the 
mathematical inability to determine whether an objectively correct 
adjudication accords with any interpretive mechanism, including 
intentionalism. If judges prefer to hold themselves to bargains from the 
past, the argument would demand a formulation of some semblance of 
predictability. Independence would sufficiently be relaxed, because an 
objective standard was not attempted. However, a personal preference to 
uphold a former contract is simply one of many options available to each 
judge. 
The same problem corresponding to textualism and intentionalism 
surfaces in this instance.147 A judge’s attempt to read the intent of the 
“old contract” of a prior adjudication (precedent) is subject to the 
Arrovian problem at the heart of this Article. The result is that 
contracting forfeits an objective standard. This still fails to provide an 
“apply-able” mechanism in interpretation. Furthermore, contentious 
issues pose complexities. How does one contract in the face of changing 
social mores and expectations? Consider Justice Brennan’s “five-
fingered approach” to adjudication as an example of the power of one 
vote.148 
In the end, the imperative use of the subjective illustrates why 
appellate courts so often seem to struggle when dealing with our nation’s 
important cultural issues, federal and state powers battles, and statutory 
interpretations. This is not to say that an attempt to promote fidelity with 
the past is futile. Rather, the attempt is simply one preference to be 
compared with textualism, pragmatism, Dworkinism, etc., because all 
potentially provide a determination of “reasonableness,” which is the true 
high watermark for interpretation, without an objective restriction. 
                                                                                                             
 146 Nicholas Zeppos stated that “if the motivations and intentions of the legislature are 
impossible to discern, it seems equally probable that it is also impossible to extract the 
‘real’ motivations of our often inscrutable courts.” Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor 
and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L. J. 353, 412 (1989). Zeppos discussed judicial 
candor, and concluded that there was not enough knowledge about the judicial process to 
assert a call for judicial candor. A deeper understanding of the motivations and intentions 
of the judiciary is necessary to understand the depth and success of the above restrictions. 
This is an area poised for future research in public choice. See also MUELLER, supra note 
23, at 401 (noting that the motivation of judges “remains largely an empty black box in 
the public choice literature”). 
 147 See supra Part IIIA. 
 148 See supra note 137 and corresponding text. 
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2. Stare Decisis 
Stare decisis is important in light of Arrow’s consequences for 
jurisprudential theory. Alexander Hamilton wrote of a predicted 
“feebleness” of the judiciary relative to the other branches because the 
judiciary should not exert “force of will” to create laws in sufficient 
number to do damage.149 Expecting judges to be tied down by precedent, 
Hamilton found less reason to worry about judicial tyranny.150 
But judges are not “tied down” by the “application” of precedent, as 
Chief Justice Roberts offers, since that application cannot result from an 
objective tool.151 To believe otherwise is to incorrectly presume that 
group-decision limitations are non-existent. Ignorance of the Arrovian 
failure may lead to a view that an objective application of law seems to 
support stare decisis theory. Discovering the failure may rock one’s faith 
in adjudication, and may taint perception of federal judges who are 
nearly absolved of restraints after they are appointed.152 When properly 
internalizing the capacity of the courts, there is no objective way to show 
the “correct” interpretation; therefore no interpretation is completely 
wrong or right. 
Consequently, because there is no possible way to determine an 
objectively correct outcome in communal interpretation, there should be 
no expectation of legitimate interpretation stemming from an objective 
application of consistent case law. It follows that since there can be no 
one “right” interpretation,153 then appellate courts can offer nothing more 
                                                                                                             
 149 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 150 Id. 
 151 See supra note 1. 
 152 “A federal judge can be lazy, lack judicial temperament, mistreat his staff, berate 
without reason the lawyers who appear before him, be reprimanded for ethical lapses, 
verge on or even slide into senility, be continually reversed for elementary legal mistakes, 
hold under advisement for years cases that could be decided perfectly well in days or 
weeks, leak confidential information to the  press, pursue a nakedly political agenda, and 
misbehave in other ways that might get even a tenured civil servant or university 
professor fired; he will retain his office.” RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 111 
(Harvard University Press 1995). See also United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 
108 (2001) (citing multiple statements by the trial court judge regarding his “distaste for 
the defense of technological integration,” while commenting on Bill Gates’ business 
ethics failings, and an overall bias against the defendant). 
 153 Such subjective decisions may be cases involving fundamental rights. See Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (finding certain rights to abortion 
protected under Constitution—“At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. 
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State.”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 
(2003) (adopting the language of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, finding adult consensual 
conduct protected by Constitution); S. Burlington County. N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel, 
92 N.J. 158 (1983) (encouraging a municipality to require a developer to set aside 20% of 
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than debates about which argument is more persuasive than another. The 
courts, at best, vacillate on the bell curve of “reasonable judges 
interpreting reasonably,” and continuing discussion ensues rather than 
rote algorithms. Appellate courts are thus never objectively nor 
concretely applying stare decisis; they only create a reasonable 
interpretation of precedent. 
Judge Easterbrook has argued that precedent “cuts down on 
idiosyncratic conclusions by subjecting each judge’s work to a test of 
congruence with conclusions of those confronting the same problem.”154 
This may be true, but it only indicates that an appellate court is signaling 
the course of future cases to future litigants. Lawyers may internalize the 
facts of cases to make predictions, but there is no application of objective 
criteria. 
Easterbrook also claims that stare decisis will create “path 
dependence”—the phenomenon of arbitrary factual predicates 
developing the law.155 This idea should be dismissed if it is posed as an 
objective control, because each case includes a re-interpretation of 
previous cases. Judges “bargain” over former meanings. In other words, 
they alter outcomes using intensity preference to “fix” the effect of 
specific precedents, perhaps by “distinguishing” them, thus avoiding the 
path dependence problem.156 Stated another way, there can be no path 
dependence when there is no objective rule of law applied. Even the 
                                                                                                             
proposed housing units for “inclusionary,” as opposed to exclusionary, purposes, under 
state constitutional substantive due process and equal protection grounds). 
 154 Frank M. Easterbrook, The Federalist Society Sixth Annual Symposium on Law 
and Public Policy: The Crisis in Legal Theory and The Revival of Classical 
Jurisprudence: Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV 422, 
423 (1988). 
 155 Id. at 426 (stating that “[n]o sound system of law allows such fundamental 
questions to turn solely on the order in which cases arrive for decision—but stare decisis 
could do so unless tempered”). 
 156 Many commentators agree there is a path dependence problem. See, e.g., Cass R. 
Sunstein, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 786 n.150 (1993) (“A strong theory of stare decisis, 
combined with commitment to analogical thinking, may alleviate some of the cycling 
problems and this produce greater stability in law, but it will be difficult to achieve real 
coherence through decentralized, multimember courts. . . . [A]nalogical reasoning [may] 
diminish cycling; but the problem of path dependence will result in a high degree of 
arbitrariness.”); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: 
Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (“The fact that a court in a 
rather simple case . . . could face a choice between two voting protocols, each of which 
seems quite reasonable . . . yet discover that the outcome of the case will turn on the 
choice between them, is the product of a structural paradox latent in appellate 
adjudication.”). Kornhauser and Sager suggest that a multimember court should first ask 
how it should collectively decide the case in light of the complexities of issues versus 
outcome voting. Id. at 30. The authors conclude that at times multimember courts should 
adopt issue-by-issue voting. Otherwise, arbitrary identities and personal beliefs of any 
particular judge will be overly important. Id. at 38. 
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seemingly “black letter law” cases must always be bargained for using 
the cardinal tool of the intensity of conviction. 
In conclusion, many people, including judges, expect courts to 
simply “apply” stare decisis in a case, or perhaps at the very least not 
suffer from choosing among an open array of irreconcilable yet equally 
plausible terms in every single case. Appellate decisions inherently carry 
a limitation controverting the assumed legitimacy and purported strength 
of stare decisis, if that strength derives from a legal “application.” 
Hamilton’s Federalist Papers argument may be best: the efficacy of 
judges and stare decisis depends on the reasonable, and security for 
liberties rests ultimately in “public opinion, and on the general spirit of 
the people and of the government.”157 Paraphrasing Hart, reasonable 
judges make decisions about how legislators and judges are reasonable 
persons seeking reasonable purposes, reasonably.158 The description 
captures the essence of jurisprudential stare decisis. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article examines the impact of Arrow’s proof on appellate 
jurisprudence. It considers whether the current understanding of the 
interaction between legislatures and the judiciary is correct—specifically 
within the multimember courts. The Article first reviewed Arrow’s 
Impossibility Theorem, and then applied Arrow to legislatures to reach 
the conclusion that legislative intent is critical to the liberal project’s 
Rule of Law.  
Legislative intent is not precluded by Arrow’s Theorem, which is 
an important realization in the analysis of the relationship between the 
judiciary and the legislature. The legislature does not necessarily carry 
the roots of the judiciary’s failure to apply the law. The Article argues 
that appellate courts cannot ordinally rank preferences to decide cases, 
but must bargain to perform statutory interpretation. Ordinal rankings 
demand a dictator, but the Article proves how the dictator problem is 
solved with cardinal preference ordering which relaxes the Independence 
axiom. The Article then demonstrates that cardinal bargaining is a 
necessary precursor for legislative intent and functions as a 
jurisprudential contradiction in the judiciary for the liberal project’s Rule 
of Law. 
                                                                                                             
 157 THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). The desire to create “legitimacy” 
restricts judges on an individual basis. Judges must mind their acts because “beyond 
comparison [the judiciary is] the weakest of the three departments of power . . . [and] all 
possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks.” THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 158 See supra note 141. 
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This result seems to contradict a “purist” view of the Rule of Law. 
Vote-trading, strategizing, or bargaining over the precious Rule of Law 
seems beneath the conduct of appellate judges, and more like activity in 
a sausage factory.159 However, relaxing the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives axiom is not just practical, but also the only axiom that may 
be relaxed in multimember courts. This method sustains fidelity to 
majority rule in the decision-making process, providing an avenue for 
adjudication of cases. The realization should not shatter assumptions of 
predictability desired in the Rule of Law. Rather, it explains what 
functions appellate courts may be fit to fulfill and where they will fail. If 
mere finality is desirable, then allowing appellate courts to interpret 
regulations provides greater potential for individuals to internalize 
expectations of how courts in the future would treat similar legal issues. 
Unpredictability remains, but future potential parties internalize this so 
settlements may occur within range of unpredictable outcomes. 
Alternatively, if society expects appellate courts to avoid political 
morality judgments in all cases, the expectation is irrational. The only 
workable expectation is that political power must be wielded by judges, 
and is not objectively “applied.” 
Without some sort of cardinal bargain, incoherence is inevitable—
the judiciary’s interpretation of statutes would be arbitrary with 
inconclusive adjudications punctuated by random failures of the majority 
rule. Consequently, the law would develop in an irrational, piecemeal 
manner.160 However, this does not occur. 
The existence of the conflict between objectivity and political 
power is confirmed by this Article. However, bargaining should not be 
considered hidden, secretive, or invidious—and is certainly not “wrong.” 
It is necessary and thus “acceptable,” notwithstanding fears of 
“nihilism.” Interpreting G. Calabresi, the search for truth should trump 
fears that the foundation for the rule of law is upon gossamer cables. This 
is the task when looking in jurisprudence’s “dark corners.”161 
The result of an Arrovian analysis applied to decision-making in 
appellate courts reveals that the most controversial cases in law are 
                                                                                                             
 159 “I have seen sausage being made (for two summers, when I worked my way 
through college by working the graveyard shift at a meat packing plant), and I have seen 
the [Supreme] Court make law. It is not like making sausage. Instead, our system of 
Constitutional liberties, protected by our state and federal courts, has made us the envy of 
the world. The newly emerging democracies seek to emulate our legal system, and our 
greatest export has become our Bill of Rights.” 7 RONALD ROTUNDA, MODERN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW v (7th ed. Supp. 2005). 
 160 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
xi (Amy Gutmann ed,, Princeton University Press 1997). 
 161 Calabresi, G., Letter, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 23 (1985). 
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problematic and predictably irreconcilable, if not seemingly hypocritical, 
but there is a mathematical reason for this. The reason for inconsistency 
is not necessarily insincerity or deceit by judges, nor even some 
contemptible strategy by those who appoint them. Rather, institutional 
limitations exist in the communal procedures of group decision-making 
in the courts. 
The subjective determinations of appellate court judges control the 
direction of stare decisis, which manifests in contracts among judges 
between themselves and with their future replacements. Yet the 
legitimacy of stare decisis does not result from an “application” of law 
because that application is impossible. This latter aspect may seem 
strange, but nevertheless must be accepted as fact. Chief Justice Roberts 
does not “apply” law. Likewise, the Article’s introductory quotes from 
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg and Judge and Professor Bork are 
hortatory refrains; their principles are not “apply-able” either. 
Legislative bargaining, and thus the non-existence of the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assumption in the legislature, 
enables the creation of laws. Judicial bargaining, and the same non-
existence of the Independence assumption in appellate courts, enables 
adjudications. Appellate court judges make decisions based on personal 
perceptions of the best arguments and rhetoric available in a case. While 
subjective authority is required in judicial decisions, bargains are also 
necessary because Dworkin’s reputed Herculean decision-maker does 
not exist and is never appointed to rule. This Article relates how Arrow’s 
proof reveals the theoretical problems in jurisprudence, but also 
illuminates how Arrow influences the process of appellate adjudication. 
 
